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The first chapter explores the effect of credit constraints on production-generated 
pollution emissions. I develop a theoretical model wherein polluting firms borrow 
externally to finance investment in various assets, subject to a credit constraint with 
lenders. The main insight of the model is that credit constraints distort the composition of 
assets towards over-investment in tangible assets, which can be pledged as collateral, 
thereby increasing the intensity of pollution emissions. The predictions of the model are 
tested using plant-level pollution emissions data for manufacturing plants from the EPA's 
Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators, and measures of creditworthiness from Dunn 
and Bradstreet. The empirical results indicate that credit constraints significantly increase 
pollution emissions (even after accounting for a countervailing scale effect) using both 
Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects, and the results withstand multiple robustness checks. 
Overall, I find that a one standard deviation in creditworthiness reduces pollution 
emissions by around 4.5 percent.  
  
The second chapter focuses on the influence of household credit constraints in a 
general equilibrium framework on the composition of output in the  “clean” and “dirty” 
industries and the pollution intensity of production, which in turn determines aggregate 
pollution emissions. I propose a simple two-sector model, where producer-consumers 
face credit constraints when young and, therefore, invest less in human capital. As a 
result, production is oriented towards more pollution-intensive industries and therefore 
entails more pollution. This prediction is supported for production-generated air 
pollutants SO2 and lead using both reduced-form and two-stage regressions. 
The third chapter explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for 
corporate executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking. This chapter develops a 
theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent-seeking responses and 
provides a framework to empirically quantify the two responses. Using executive 
compensation and governance data, this paper empirically demonstrates that rent seeking 
constitutes a quantitatively significant response to changes in marginal income tax rates. 
Finally, this paper provides another piece of evidence suggesting that tax cuts may be one 
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Chapter 1: Do Credit Constraints Favor Dirty
Production? Theory and Plant-Level Evidence
1 Introduction
External credit is indispensable to financing firm investment. Accordingly, credit interme-
diation entails overcoming a number of obstacles, such as contractual incompleteness and
asymmetric information.1 One approach to overcoming these credit constraints, elucidated
by the incomplete contracts literature, is to invest in physical assets that can be pledged as
collateral (Williamson, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1994). Specifically, tangible assets, such as
buildings and structures, equipment, and natural resources, retain greater residual value to
lenders in the case that the firm defaults or repudiates the contract (Braun, 2003; Manova,
2012).2 Conversely, intangible assets, such as human capital (worker and manager train-
ing), product and process innovation (research and development), and marketing, tend to
be inalienable and firm specific in nature and therefore have less residual value to lenders.3
Credit constraints therefore bias investment towards tangible assets at the expense of intan-
gible assets, which in turn has repercussions for the environment.
Significant attention has been given to the role of credit constraints in firm investment
and performance; however, to date, the consequences for the environment have not been
explored. This is the first paper to explore the effect of credit constraints on production-
generated pollution emissions. To that end, I develop a theoretical model incorporating
1The literature is vast, see Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2001) for survey articles. Empirical studies docu-
ment that credit constraints bear on firm investment and performance. For example, Midrigan and Xu (2012)
find that credit frictions reduce total factor productivity by up to 40 percent, and Hennessy and Whited (2007)
find that credit frictions represent 13 and 25 percent of financing costs for large and small firms.
2Retaining greater residual value implies that shifting control from firms to creditors is less costly, or
equally, that a greater fraction can be pledged as collateral (collateralized debt).
3Intangible assets are considered broadly to include all factors contributing to total output not caused
by tangible assets. Conventional accounting measures (book value) of assets therefore only partially capture
intangible assets defined herein. For example, the book value of intangible assets includes the value of patents
but not comprehensive knowledge.
1
external borrowing to analyze the link between credit constraints and pollution emissions.
The predictions of the model are tested using a unique dataset that matches plant measures
of creditworthiness and pollution emissions. Both the theory and empirics attest that credit
constraints increase pollution emissions.
While several studies have explored the relationship between various measures of fi-
nancial performance and environmental performance; no study, to my knowledge, has at-
tempted to theoretically or empirically isolate the effect of credit constraints on environ-
mental performance. A recent study by Earnhart and Segerson (2012) (henceforth E&S)
is the first paper to theoretically explore various dimensions of financial status on environ-
mental performance, focusing on the effect of profitability, solvency risks, and liquidity, on
the efficacy of environmental regulations on reducing emissions.4 While the study adds to
our understanding by distinguishing between various dimensions of financial status, E&S
abstract from external borrowing, which is the primary financing source for most firms
(Fazzari et al., 1988).5 This paper incorporates external borrowing that entails satisfying a
credit constraint with lenders. Incorporating external borrowing, along with the generaliza-
tion that firms employ various inputs that are imperfect substitutes, generates the prediction
that credit constraints impact the intensity of pollution emissions.
The empirical literature on firm environmental and financial performance does not ac-
count for credit constraints and, with the exception of E&S, focuses solely on the role of
profitability. E&S conduct an empirical analysis for wastewater discharges of 508 “major”
publicly held chemical manufacturing facilities using indirect measures of liquidity and sol-
vency risks.6 One shortcoming of using only major publicly-held companies (and potential
4E&S develop an “crime and punishment” (Becker, 1968) model examining optimal pollution abatement
for compliance with an emissions standard in the presence of liquidity and solvency constraints, focusing on
the conditional effect of expected punishments on compliance, which is not considered in this paper. E&S do
not explicitly model production (abatement is the only decision variable), which is necessary but not sufficient
to generate the predictions in this paper.
5Fazzari et al. (1988) report that for manufacturing firms the majority of funding is long-term bank debt,
except for large firms with over $250 million in assets, which use around 60 percent retained earnings.
6E&S use the firm’s current ratio as a measure of solvency and the year end cash stock as a measure of
liquidity. The empirical analysis also departs from E&S by using a more comprehensive measure of emissions
(releases to air, water, landfill) and employing multiple emissions measures capturing both pounds and the
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explanation for not finding significant results), is selection bias–publicly held companies
have unique capital structures, financing investments mostly through retained earnings and
equity, and are therefore less affected by credit and liquidity constraints. This paper takes
advantage of a recently-released dataset containing data for both privately and publicly-
held plants in all manufacturing industries (nearly 30,000 in total) and a unique plant-level
measure of credit constraints, which is a direct measure of the parameter in the theoretical
model. I find significant effects of credit constraints on pollution emissions and provide
direct evidence of the mechanisms linking credit constraints and emissions.
This paper develops a conceptual model focusing on the partial equilibrium analysis
of a representative firm that generates pollution emissions as a byproduct of production.
I posit that firms produce a final good using intermediate factors tangible and intangible
assets. Financing production of tangible and intangible assets requires external lending,
which entails satisfying an incentive compatibility constraint (credit constraint) with a risk-
neutral lender. Due to price and production risks, as well as contractual incompleteness
and asymmetric information, lenders assign a positive probability to the event that the firm
defaults, in which case a fraction of the investment is recovered by the lender. Incentive
compatibility therefore requires that the lender’s expected return must exceed an exogenous
reservation return. The model demonstrates that greater assigned probability to the default
state strengthens the credit constraint and increases the incentive to invest in tangible assets,
which retain greater residual value in default states. Thus, credit constraints increase the
intensity of pollution emissions whenever the intensity of pollution emissions is positively
associated with the share of tangible assets in production. Finally, credit constraints might
also reduce output implying that net effect of credit constraints on total emissions is an
empirical question.
The empirical analysis explores the impact of credit constraints on pollution emissions
for a panel of manufacturing plants, using the Environmental Protection Agency’s Risk-
health risk of emissions. I also expand the span of the data from 7 to 20 years.
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Screening Environmental Indicators and the National Establishment of Time Series, among
several other datasets. Specifically, I investigate the impact of credit constraints, using
measures of creditworthiness from Dunn and Bradstreet, on several measures of pollution
emissions, including total pounds of emissions, the potential risk of emissions to human
health, and the actual risk of emissions to human health given the characteristics of the
exposed surrounding population. The empirical analysis also estimates the effect of credit
constraints on output, thereby distinguishing between “technique” and “scale” effects of
credit constraints on pollution emissions. Finally, using the Compustat annual industrial
dataset, I explore the intermediate relationships between firm-level credit constraints and
the share of tangible assets, and the share of tangible assets and aggregate firm-level emis-
sions.
The results suggest that credit constraints significantly increase pollution emissions
(even after accounting for the countervailing scale effect) using both Pooled OLS and
Fixed Effects.7 I find that a one-standard deviation increase in creditworthiness reduces
pollution emissions by approximately 4.5 percent. The results are statistically significant
and withstand numerous robustness checks, including adding a rich set of controls, em-
ploying lagged dependent variables, and instrumental variables. Moreover, heterogeneous
effects of credit constraints on pollution emissions are highly consistent with expectations.
For example, the impact of credit constraints is particularly acute in industries with greater
reliance on external credit. The firm-level analysis validates the intermediate relationships–
credit constraints are positively associated with the share of tangible assets, and the share
of tangible assets is positively associated with pollution emissions. Finally, because firms
own plants in multiple industries, I disentangle the technique and composition effects of
the share of tangible assets on pollution emissions and find that the former is the primary
effect.8
7Moreover, the dataset affords significant degrees of freedom, which permits employing industry by year
and state by year effects to account for time-variant heterogeneous pollution policies and input and output
price shocks.
8The technique effect entails an increase in emissions of all plants belonging to the firm (holding the
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More broadly, this paper is related to the literature exploring the relationship between
financial performance and environmental performance, which contains inconclusive and
often contradictory findings. Financial performance is typically a measure of profitabil-
ity and various, often opposing, mechanisms are proposed. It is therefore not surprising
that the results are inconclusive, though there are other potential concerns, such as non-
representative, and very small, samples. Gray and Deily (1996) and Shadbegian and Gray
(2005) find that more profitable firms are not more likely to comply with environmental
standards, whereas Maynard and Shortle (2001) find that more profitable firms are more
likely to invest in a clean technology.9 Earnhart and Lizal (2006, 2010) report seemingly
incongruous findings for industrial firms in the Czech Republic. On the one hand, prof-
its are positively associated with air pollution (Earnhart and Lizal, 2006); and on the other
hand, value added is negatively associated with air pollution emissions (Earnhart and Lizal,
2010).
Since research and development and manager training are investments in intangible
assets, this paper is consistent with empirical studies documenting that more efficient firms
have lower abatement costs (Gray and Shadbegian, 1995; Shadbegian and Gray, 2003),
as well as pollution emissions (Cui and Ji, 2011). Moreover, improved management is
associated with lower energy intensity (Bloom et al., 2010).
The findings of this paper have policy implications for both developed and developing
countries. Governments in developed countries routinely intervene in credit markets to re-
duce credit constraints, such as the loan guarantees by the Small Business Administration
in the United States. If these interventions are effective at reducing credit constraints then
they might confer environmental benefits, which should be taken into consideration. How-
ever, such interventions typically aim at promoting investment in fixed capital assets, such
as structures and equipment, which are primarily tangible assets. This paper highlights that
composition of output across plants constant), whereas the composition effect entails an increase in output in
plants in pollution-intensive industries.
9Gray and Deily (1996) analyze 41 steel plants, Shadbegian and Gray (2005) analyze 116 pulp and paper
mills, and Maynard and Shortle (2001) analyze 75 bleached kraft pulp mills.
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promoting investment in tangible assets, at the cost of financing intangibles, exacerbates
the bias in investment towards tangible assets, which generate greater pollution emissions.
Moreover, existing tax policy is also biased towards tangible assets, through various tax
incentives and accelerated depreciation rates. Reducing credit constraints for investment
in intangible assets and pollution abatement equipment, and eliminating the bias generated
through tax policy can therefore mitigate the effects of credit market distortions on pollu-
tion emissions. Finally, there are many avenues for reforming the legal and institutional
environment in the context of developing countries, such as increasing creditor rights and
promoting information sharing through credit bureau registries, to reduce the influence of
credit constraints on pollution emissions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
model, generates the primary estimation equation, and outlines the identification strategy.
Section 3 describes the data and empirical model specifications, presents the regression
analysis and robustness checks, and discusses the findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Conceptual Model
This section develops a simple theoretical model exploring the relationship between credit
constraints and pollution emissions. The model focuses on the static partial equilibrium
analysis of a representative firm that generates pollution emissions as a byproduct of pro-
duction and relies on raising external credit to finance investments.
Following the standard approach in the environmental economics literature, I model
pollution emissions as an additional factor of production.10 The underlying assumption is
that reducing the pollution necessarily entails the diversion of productive inputs towards
abatement activities, thereby reducing the availability of inputs to produce the final con-
10(Cropper and Oates, 1992) survey the environmental economics literature, which largely treats pollution
emissions “simply as another factor of production.” More recent studies treating pollution emissions as an
input include Taylor and Copeland (1994); López (1994); Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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sumption good. Incorporating abatement activities as implicit in the production process
follows under certain assumptions regarding the abatement and production technologies,
which are beyond the scope of this paper to fully address. (See Cropper and Oates (1992)
for a discussion of the assumptions generating the result.) The conventional model has
been criticized on the basis of incompatibility with materials balance (or conservation laws
of mass and energy); however, models consistent with these principles add a significant
amount of complexity (Pethig, 2006; Krysiak and Krysiak, 2003). To keep the analysis
tractable and to add financing considerations, I use the conventional approach, modeling
pollution as an input in production. The implications of employing an framework consis-
tent with materials balance are discussed after presenting the baseline model.
The lending incentive compatibility constraint is similar to Manova (2012), with the
generalization that the composition of assets is endogenous. The implications of various
generalizations are discussed at several points.
2.1 Production
Firms produce a homogenous final good using two intermediate goods: tangible and intan-
gible assets. Both intermediate assets are produced using variable and fixed inputs, which
I refer to as “labor” and “capital.” The defining feature is that labor does not require ex-
ternal financing, whereas capital requires external financing. I refer to capital employed
in producing tangible and intangible assets as tangible and intangible capital. Production
of tangible assets, unlike intangible assets, generates pollution emissions as a byproduct.11
Production of the final good exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with an elas-
11The terminology tangible and intangible assets bears resemblance to the conventional “dirty” and “clean”
goods (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). The assumption that only tangible assets generate pollution emissions
is for simplicity; the necessary assumption is that production of tangible assets entails relatively greater
pollution emissions than production of intangible assets (Copeland and Taylor (2004), among others, use a
similar simplifying assumption).
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where x and y are tangible and intangible assets, respectively.















where z is pollution emissions, l
x
is labor employed in producing x, and l
y
is labor em-
ployed in producing y. To facilitate subsequent derivations, I express tangible and intangi-
ble capital as k
x
= ✓k and k
y
= (1  ✓)k, where k is the aggregate firm capital and ✓ is the
share of tangible capital.
Consistency with the balance of materials principle would follow from either (i) em-
ploying tangible entails more materials in production or (ii) that emissions generated from
employing tangible assets require more intensive use of traditional inputs to convert into
“abatement residuals” (Pethig, 2006). It seems reasonable to assume that materials exhibit
a higher degree of complementarity with tangible inputs vis-à-vis intangible inputs, which
would be consistent with balance of materials principle.
2.2 Financing
Labor inputs and pollution “permits” are purchased at exogenous market rates w and ⌧ ,
respectively. Capital is purchased at an exogenous market rate r, but capital purchases
12The CES production is a generalization of the canonical Cobb-Douglas framework (Copeland Taylor,
1994). The parameters   and   are share and productivity coefficients, respectively. That   > 1 is a conven-
tional assumption in similar CES models focusing on clean and dirty inputs (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
8
must be financed from an external lender. Because the lender has an outside reservation
return, financing capital purchases entails satisfying the lender’s participation constraint,
implying a cost premium of capital whenever the constraint is binding.
Productivity and solvency shocks, as well as contractual incompleteness and asymmet-
ric information, imply that lending entails “default risk.” That is, default risk implies that
the lender associates an ex-ante subjective probability with the event that the loan will not
be repaid, in which case a fraction of the loan is recovered by the lender. The consequence
of greater default risk is therefore that risk-neutral lenders will require a higher ex-ante rate
of return (interest rate).
2.2.1 Lenders
Lenders are risk neutral and, without loss of generality, have a reservation rate of return
normalized to 0.13 The lender’s participation constraint for an arbitrary loan of amount
h > 0 is therefore
  h+ (1   )Rh+  ⇠h   0 (4)
where R   0 is the (endogenous) ex-ante rate of return to the lender in the case that
the firm does not default,   2 (0, 1) is the lender’s subjective probability assigned to the
default state, and ⇠ 2 (0, 1) is the percentage of the loan that can be pledged as collateral.14
In other words, ⇠ is the lender’s residual value of the loan. Therefore, the second term is
the payoff in the non-default state, while the third term is payoff in the default state. Thus,
the participation constraint implies that the loan amount must be exceeded by the lender’s
expected return.
Because 4 implies that R > 0, the lender’s participation constraint is binding. I incor-
porate the lender’s participation constraint which creates a link between the firm’s credit
13The results would not change qualitatively if lenders could earn a market net interest rate r̃.
14To be precise,   is the subjective probability measure associated with the default state, in a discrete
sample space consisting of default and non-default states. Because the firm and lender are risk-neutral the
second moment of the probability measure is immaterial.
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constraint and the cost premium of external credit. Firms make a one-time offer to lenders,
varying the ex-ante rate of return to bring the lender to his participation constraint. Lenders
participate whenever
R   1   ⇠
1    (5)
Differences in the fraction of capital that can be pledged as collateral between tangible and
intangible capital therefore imply differences in the lender’s participation constraint. Recall





).For simplicity, I assume that ⇠
x
= 1 and ⇠
y
= 0, which implies that
R
x









are the cost premiums associated with financing tangible and intangible
capital. Expression (6) demonstrates that financing tangible capital entails no cost premium
whenever tangible capital can be entirely pledged as collateral. On the other hand, financing
intangible capital entails a cost premium whenever there is a positive probability of default.
2.2.2 Capital Costs
The firm’s capital costs consists of the exogenous market cost of capital multiplied by the
cost premium of borrowed funds, weighted by the share of tangible and intangible capital
purchased. Thus, the per-unit cost of total capital is





Lemma 1: Investment in intangible capital entails a cost premium, which is increasing in
default risk. In particular, tangible and intangible capital costs are given by
r
x
= r and r
y
= rµ   r (8)
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where µ = 1 +  /(1   ) > 1.
Proof: Use (6) in (7) and differentiate (7) with respect to ✓ and 1  ✓. ⇤
The variable µ > 1 represents the cost premium associated with the credit constraint,
which is monotonically increasing in default risk. Therefore, I refer to an increase in µ as
an increase in credit constraints.15
2.3 Production Decisions




= ⌧↵w r1 ↵   and c
y
= w⌘r1 ⌘µ1 ⌘ (9)

































I define the above ratio between tangible and intangible assets as “asset tangibility.”
Result 1: Asset tangibility is decreasing in the cost of pollution permits, and increasing in
the cost of capital and labor whenever tangible assets employ these factors more intensively
than intangible assets. Finally, asset tangibility is increasing in credit constraints. In
15Asymmetric financing costs reported in Lemma 1 are the consequence of asymmetric residual value
of assets. Another source of variation, not explicitly modeled, is heterogeneous input risks associated with
tangible and intangible assets. If default risk is positively associated with employing intangible assets then
incorporating input risks would reinforce Lemma 1.
16Because the lender is the residual claimant in the default state, risk does not distort production decisions.
The results would be reinforced if the firm were also a residual claimant and tangible assets were less costly
to liquidate than intangible assets.
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other words, credit constraints distort the optimal asset ratio, leading to over-investment
in tangible assets.
Proof: Follows from 11. ⇤
Expression (11) demonstrates that asset tangibility is determined by (i) the production
technology, (ii) relative factor prices, and (iii) credit constraints. The focus of this paper is





The value ̄ is therefore the prevailing asset ratio absent credit constraints, representing
the influence of the production technology and relative factor prices.17 The residual term
represents the distortion generated by credit constraints, which increase endogenous asset
tangibility.
2.4 Emissions Intensity
Define emissions intensity as e = z/q. Shepherd’s Lemma implies that emissions intensity
is
















Emissions intensity is therefore determined by the price of pollution permits and the per-
unit cost of tangible and intangible assets.
The following Lemma elucidates the intermediate relationship between asset tangibility
and emissions intensity.
Lemma 2: Pollution emissions intensity is determined by asset tangibility, as well as ex-
ogenous factor prices and the production technology. Specifically, emissions intensity and










asset tangibility are positively related. That is,







(1   ) +   1   
i
> 0 (14)
Proof: Using expressions (9) to (13) imply that
e = (↵/ )⌧↵ 1w r1 ↵  
h⇣






Expression (15) can be expressed in terms of the frictionless asset tangibility (̄) and
the distortion generated by credit constraints using the decomposition in (12). The next
result explicates the comparative statics between credit constraints and emissions intensity.
Result 2: Credit constraints increase emissions intensity. Moreover, pollution emissions
intensity can be expressed as the following reduced-form equation














Proof: Follows from (9), (10), and (13) ⇤
Lemma 2 and Result 2, which explicate the intermediate and reduced-form relation-
ships, are the primary empirical predictions of the model.
2.5 Pollution Emissions
The primary result of the conceptual analysis, as demonstrated in the previous section, is
that credit constraints increase emissions intensity. Pollution emissions are, of course, the
product of emissions intensity and output z = eq (the so-called technique and scale effects).
And output is decreasing in credit constraints whenever the firm’s supply curve is upward
sloping or the final good’s demand curve is downward sloping. The assumptions of constant
13
returns to scale and exogenous prices preclude the determination of the scale effect because
output cannot be determined when the supply curve is perfectly elastic, unless the demand
curve is sloping downward. The effect of credit constraints on pollution emissions, thus,
depends on parameters that cannot be known with much degree of certainty and is therefore
an empirical question, which will be take up in the subsequent section.
While the impact of credit constraints on pollution emissions is an empirical question,
one simple approach to derive sharp predictions for the net effect is to assume that firms face
downward sloping demand curves for “differentiated” goods. The rest of the conceptual
analysis explores this case in the interest of illustration, not to generate testable predictions.
The results would also follow from imposing diminishing returns to scale; however, this
would add a great deal of algebraic clutter to the prior results and preclude deriving closed-
form solutions. The assumption that demand is downward sloping does not affect any of
the previous results and is analytically expedient.
For simplicity, I assume that the firm operates in monopolist competition, implying that
it faces a downward-sloping demand curve. Recall, profit maximization in the canonical
monopolistic competition model implies a constant markup over marginal cost and equi-














where p is the price of a good, ✏ = 1/(1  %) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, Y is total
expenditures, and P is the ideal price index.18
The effect of credit constraints consists of two analytically distinct effects: a price
substitution effect between factor costs of tangible and intangible assets (the technique








effect) and an output change induced by a change in the marginal cost of the final good (the
scale effect). The latter effect implies that credit constraints increase the marginal cost of
the final good, leading to upward shift in the supply curve, which in turn decreases output
and the demand for pollution emissions.
Result 3: Credit constraints increase pollution emissions if and only if the production
elasticity of substitution is greater than the consumption elasticity of substitution (  > ✏).
















The intuition for Result 3 is straightforward. First, greater substitutability between tan-
gible and intangible assets in production implies that an increase in the cost of intangible
assets induces a significant substitution effect but does not significantly reduce the supply
curve of the final good. Second, less substitutability in consumption implies that the de-
mand curve is steeper, implying that a decline in supply leads to a significant price effect,
but only a weak scale effect. Thus, greater substitutability in production and less substi-
tutability in consumption implies that scale effect is dominated by the technique effect.
And the opposite whenever production exhibits less substitutability than consumption.
2.6 Empirical Model Specification
This section generates the reduced-form model to be estimated. In the Appendix (Sec-
tion A1.1), I demonstrate that pollution emissions can be expressed by the reduced-form
relationship










where circumflex denotes relative change and  is the net effect of various production-
technology parameters.19 The   parameters represent the elasticity of pollution emissions
with respect to various variables. The exact parameters are reported in the Appendix.
The empirical analysis uses plant-level measures of pollution emissions as the depen-
dent variable (z). The primary variable of interest is the elasticity of emissions with respect
to credit constraints  
µ
, which is positive from Result 2. Because credit constraints (µ)
are monotonically increasing in the subjective probability of default ( ), an ideal measure
of credit constraints is not the actual risk of default, which is unobservable, but the value
that lenders assign to default. Because lenders rely on measures of creditworthiness to de-
termine credit risk, I use plant-level measures of creditworthiness as a measure for credit
constraints. Since creditworthiness is inversely related to credit constraints, the expect sign
of the coefficient is negative.
I use plant-level sales (deflated by industry) for output (q) and state by year and in-
dustry by year fixed effects to control for pollution policy and market factor prices (⌧ , w,
and r).20 Employing state by year and industry by year effects also controls for all time-
varying unobservable factors at the industry and state levels that influence emissions. This
includes, for example, technical change and demand shocks that influence specific indus-
tries and states over time. Finally, production intensity and share parameters ( ,  ,↵,  , ⌘)
are accounted for using plant Fixed Effects and industry by year effects, while factor pro-
ductivity ( ) is accounted for using a plant-level measure of productivity. In sum, I control
for using plant productivity, industry by year effects, and plant Fixed Effects. Employing
plant Fixed Effects also controls for all time-invariant unobservable factors. The remaining
empirical issues are discussed in the subsequent section.
19Relative change in pollution emissions, for example, describes ẑ = dz/z. Recall q is output, µ is credit
constraints (increasing transformation of default risk), and ⌧ , w, and r, are the market prices of emissions,
labor, and capital, respectively. The production technology parameters are  ⌘  ( ,  , ,↵, , ⌘).
20The ad-valorem emissions tax is broadly-defined to include all potential costs of emissions, such as
liability threats and pressure from consumers and investors, which are the subject of studies investigating




The empirical analysis explores the impact of credit constraints on plant-level pollution
emissions for manufacturing plants (Standard Industrial Classifications 20-39) in the United
States over two decades (1990–2009). The unit of observation is a plant (also known as
establishment or facility), which is a single physical location that produces or distributes
goods and services. Firms are dissimilar from plants because firms often own or control
several plants, which might be geographically dispersed. Additionally, the relationships be-
tween asset tangibility and pollution emissions, and credit constraints and asset tangibility,
are investigated using firm-level data.
I rely on four data sources, which provide a unique dataset. First, I use the Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) as a
measure of plant-level pollution emissions. Second, I match the RSEI emissions data with
the Dunn and Bradstreet’s (D&B) National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data. The
NETS is a longitudinal plant database containing information on plant sales, employment,
location, and a number of other characteristics. In particular, the NETS also contains plant-
level measures of creditworthiness, compiled by D&B’s DUNS Marketing Information
archive. Third, I rely on the Compustat annual industrial database, which contains detailed
firm-level data for publicly-held companies. Since a subset of plants in the RSEI dataset are
owned by Compustat firms, it is possible to match detailed financial data with plant-level
emissions. Finally, I deflate plant sales using the National Bureau of Economic Research
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database by Bartelsman and Gray (1996). See Table
5 for a terse list of all variables, sources, and descriptions.
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3.1.1 Pollution Emissions
This paper uses plant-level pollution emissions generated by the EPA’s RSEI. The RSEI
uses chemical release data from the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) to assess the
aggregate damages caused by a plant’s pollution emissions. The TRI is an annual collection
of approximately 650 toxic chemicals, including the quantity and disposal media (air, water,
landfill, etc.) of each chemical released. Most empirical studies are based on pounds of all
chemical releases, or pounds of various subgroups of chemical releases. Using pounds
of releases is problematic because chemicals are very heterogeneous, even within various
subgroups.
The RSEI accounts for the chemical toxicity, the fate and transport of the chemical, the
pathway of human exposure, and the population exposed using epidemiological and demo-
graphic information. It generates three primary measures of pollution emissions: Pounds,
Hazard, and Risk. Pounds of emissions is, simply, the unweighted sum of all chemical re-
leases. Hazard emissions weights each chemical released by its toxicity level, as measured
by epidemiological studies. Risk emissions incorporates toxicity and the disposal media
of each chemical, coupled with population characteristics of the surrounding area exposed
(from the U.S. Census Bureau). Each chemical is therefore weighted by the fate and trans-
port in the environment, the pathway of human exposure, and the population and sensitivity
of exposed populations.
From a normative point of view, Risk emissions is arguably the most important measure
of pollution emissions. One problematic feature of using Risk emissions, from a descriptive
point of view, is that it is influenced by extraneous factors (e.g., population characteristics).
This paper employs all three measures of pollution emissions, focusing primarily on Hazard
emissions.
Plants are required to report all of the approximately 650 toxic chemical releases and
release media under the Emergence Planning Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of
1986. The EPCRA applies to all manufacturing plants that employ at least ten employees
18
and release at least one of the covered toxic chemicals in excess of the designated threshold.
Releases are self-reported and, under the EPCRA, the EPA can assess a maximum civil
penalty of $25,000 per violation for not reporting or misreporting releases, but plants are
not penalized for the amount of releases reported.21 Plants, therefore, have an incentive to
accurately report their emissions.
The TRI has become the primary source by which researchers, regulators, and envi-
ronmentalists, assess plant-level environmental performance; however, a number of short-
comings have been pointed out. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address these issues
adequately and I refer to Marchi and Hamilton (2006) for a paper devoted to exploring
the accuracy of the TRI. The primary concern is that, because the data are self-reported,
emissions might not be reported accurately. Misreporting might be the consequence of
devoting insignificant effort to measurement or due to deliberate misreporting.22 As men-
tioned, plants are not penalized for the amount of releases reported; however, there might
be an incentive to misreport if public approbation or other perceived costs outweigh the
expected penalty associated with misreporting. While some misreporting is quite likely,
Marchi and Hamilton (2006) only find evidence of misreporting in two, of the twelve in-
vestigated, chemicals. Similarly, the EPA investigated reductions in reported emissions
and found that at least half, and likely more, of the reductions could be attributed to actual
reductions in emissions (EPA, 2012).
Another drawback to using the TRI is the absence of several important pollutants, in-
cluding sulfur dioxide (SO2) and mono-nitrogen dioxides (NOx), which are “criteria pol-
lutants” regulated by the EPA under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The
TRI dataset does include a number of chemicals classified as volatile organic compounds
21For the period 1990-1999, the EPA pursued 2,309 administrative actions against plants under the EPCRA
and assessed $15,000 in criminal penalties, $12,957 in civil judicial penalties, and $3,525,780 in administra-
tive penalties (EPA, 2001). In fiscal year 2001, the EPA conducted 321 environmental compliance inspec-
tions for TRI reporting and pursued 2,309 administrative actions against plants under the EPCRA (Marchi
and Hamilton, 2006).
22The EPCRA does not require uniform monitoring practices and explicitly states that plants need not
devote substantial resources to monitoring emissions (Marchi and Hamilton, 2006).
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(VOCs), particulate matter (PM), lead (Pb), and many other toxic chemicals. The compre-
hensive measure of pollution emissions employed in this study therefore, while not exhaus-
tive of all important pollutants, does include a broad set of important pollutants.
3.1.2 Plant Characteristics
The RSEI emissions data is matched to longitudinal plant data from the NETS. The NETS
is proprietary data compiled by Walls and Associates from D&B’s credit monitoring and
marketing information archives. The NETS essentially covers all plants and firms in the
United States, beginning in 1990 and extending to 2010. I match the RSEI emissions
data, which contains the EPA’s facility identification numbers reported in the TRI, using a
correspondence I created in collaboration with Walls and Associates.23
This paper employs a measure of creditworthiness from the NETS as a measure of
financial constraints. The NETS contains annual plant measures of creditworthiness from
D&B, called PayDex Scores, which are generated using payment history from all relevant
credit and business relationships, such as suppliers and vendors. PayDex Scores range
between 0 and 100 (in integer values) in ascending order of creditworthiness. According to
D&B, the Score is a measure of both late payment and default risk, where a score above 80
indicates low risk and below 50 indicates high risk.24 The NETS dataset contains annual
minimum and maximum Credit Scores. I use the maximum Credit Score because it is
plausible that plants would attempt to access credit at their peak credit score, or at least
would not attempt to access credit immediately after a downturn in their Credit Score.25
23The correspondence matches significantly more plants than previous studies: 414,602 of 453,224 (91
percent) of plant-year observations in the RSEI dataset were matched (missing values further reduce the
sample size as I will discuss in the subsequent section). Previous studies have matched the two datasets using
the EPA’s facility identification numbers and D&B numbers (DUNS); however, the DUNS numbers in the
TRI are highly inaccurate. For example, many DUNS are repeated across plants because the number belongs
to the plant’s parent, which is shared among several plants. Moreover, the EPA often assigns multiple facility
identification numbers to the same plant over the 1990-2009 period for numerous reasons. Generating the
correspondence entailed examining every non-unique match, using data provided by Walls and Associates on
plant births and deaths and plant relocations. Only plants that could be assigned a unique match between the
two datasets are included.
24For more information on PayDex Scores, see http://paydex.net/.
25Certainly, an argument might be made that the minimum Credit Score should be used because creditors
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Because it is not unambiguous that the maximum should be used, I replicate the baseline
results using both the minimum and the mean.
The PayDex Score is an ideal measure of credit constraints for several reasons. While
most empirical analyses employ indirect measures of credit constraints, Paydex Scores
are direct measures of credit constraints and, importantly, are determined by an institution
external to the firm.26 Second, credit scores are the yardstick by which creditors access
creditworthiness, which implies that it accords particularly well with the conceptual model.
Only a few studies employ credit scores as a measure of credit constraints because they
are typically not included in most datasets. One exception is Muûls (2008), who uses
European Coface credit scores for Belgian firms to explore the impact of access to credit on
exporting decisions. Muûls (2008) demonstrates that the Coface credit scores generate the
same ordinal measure of credit constraints as conventional measures of credit constraints.
For similar reasons as mentioned above, Muûls (2008) argues that using credit scores has
many advantages over conventional measures, although there are only modest differences
in practice.
The NETS also contains information on plant sales, employment, industry, location,
and numerous other variables. The primary variables employed are Sales, deflated by in-
dustry deflators from Bartelsman and Gray (1996), and Labor Productivity, calculated as
the ratio of sales to employees. Other variables include legal status (Corporation, Propri-
etorship, Partnership, or Non-Profit), trade status (Exporter, Importer, Both), Age of the
plant, Public Ownership, Corporate Ownership, Foreign Owned, Move Often, Change In-
dustry, Minority Owned, Women Owned, and CEO is a Woman. The NETS also contains
information on whether the plant has a parent headquarters or is a parent headquarters.
Neumark et al. (2011) investigate the quality of the NETS data and find the accuracy of
might place more weight on the minimum (if available) rather than maximum score. Similarly, creditors
might use some combination of the maximum and minimum.
26Indirect measures of credit constraints include, firm size, age, dividend policy, bond rating, debt-to-
asset ratios, and interest coverage ratios. See Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) for an overview of the various
measures of firms’ access to finance.
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the employment data is of similar quality as the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
Current Employment Statistics (CES) Payroll data. The primary drawback to the NETS is
that it does not include information on capital stocks, precluding the possibility of estimat-
ing a production function. Also, the NETS is not a census and it is therefore not suitable to
investigating plant births and deaths.
3.1.3 Firm Characteristics
The Standard and Poor’s Compustat annual industrial database contains detailed firm-level
financial data for publicly-held companies, beginning in 1950 and ending in 2010. The data
are matched using the ultimate parent headquarters company name in the NETS dataset
and addresses are used to corroborate the match.27Employing plant and firm-level variables
entails several drawbacks. First, publicly-held companies have unique capital structures
and tend to be less influenced by credit constraints, resulting in sample selection bias.
Second, aggregate firm-level data cannot be attributed to particular plants and emissions
data are only available for the subset of plants that report emissions to the EPA, potentially
resulting in measurement error.
While the plant-level results are the primary emphasis, the firm-level analysis shed
light on several complementary questions. First, I investigate if greater firm-level asset
tangibility is associated with greater pollution emissions across all plants. Second, I explore
if measures of firm-level credit constraints are associated with asset tangibility. As far
as I know, this is the first paper to empirically explore the relationship between credit
constraints and asset tangibility, though a complete analysis of the relationship is beyond
the scope of this paper.28
Asset Tangibility is defined, following Braun (2003) and Manova (2012), as the share
27The matched dataset consists of 1,053 firms and 9,517 plants.
28A recent working paper (Chen, 2013) theoretically and empirically demonstrates that industries with
higher asset intangibility are particularly affected by credit constraints because intangible assets cannot be
pledged as collateral. However, Chen (2013) does not consider the possibility that firms might adjust asset
composition in order to mitigate credit constraints.
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of net property, plant, and equipment in total book-value assets. I use standard measures of
credit constraints, including the Current Ratio (Current Assets to Current Liabilities) and
the Cash to Total Assets Ratio. The ratio of Total Liabilities to Total Assets is employed as
a proxy for long-run solvency. Additional controls include the Market to Book Ratio, the
Sales to Assets Ratio, and Return on Assets (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Total
Assets).
3.2 Summary Statistics
The data consists of an unbalanced panel of manufacturing plants in 2-digit Standard In-
dustrial Classification (SIC) 20 to 39, starting in 1990 and ending in 2009.29 The RSEI
dataset does not distinguish between missing and zero-valued emissions; hence, I exclude
all plants with non-positive value of emissions. I also exclude plants with missing values
recorded for Sales, Labor Productivity, and Credit Score.30 The final sample consists of
29,817 plants and 248,153 plant-year observations. The median number of years in the
sample is 7 years.
The three measures of pollution emissions are Pounds, Hazard, and Risk. Pounds is
denominated in pounds, but Hazard and Risk emissions are not denominated in meaningful
units. All emissions are highly skewed, hence, I apply a log transformation. The trans-
formed data are single-peaked and roughly symmetrical, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Ta-
ble 1 demonstrates that the three measures are highly correlated: Pounds emissions explain
roughly 51 percent of Hazard emissions and 39 percent of Risk emissions. Moreover, Haz-
ard emissions explain roughly 68 percent of Risk emissions. Table 1 demonstrates that the
29I extend the RSEI dataset from 1996 to 1990 by manually removing the raw data in the RSEI software
and replacing it with previous files provided by the EPA upon request.
30Excluding plants with zero emissions or missing values potentially engenders selection bias because
selection is non-random. Truncation of plants with emissions below the threshold is also a potential source
of bias, particularly if omitted plants also have systematically lower credit scores. Unfortunately, there are
numerous reasons plants are not included in the sample, precluding conventional approaches to mitigating
the problem. As far as I know, no studies using the RSEI dataset have discussed the implications of selection
bias or attempted to grapple with potential bias. Figure 1 does not, however, display compelling evidence of
truncation.
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levels of emissions are highly correlated with the intensities (Emissions divided by Sales)
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Figure 1: Distribution of Pounds, Hazard, and Risk emissions
Table 1: Pollution Emissions Cross-Correlations
Variables Pounds Hazard Risk Pounds* Hazard* Risk*
Pounds 1.0000
Hazard 0.5127 1.0000
Risk 0.3941 0.6729 1.0000
Pounds* 0.8748 0.4048 0.3205 1.0000
Hazard* 0.4551 0.9638 0.6493 0.4813 1.0000
Risk* 0.2995 0.5898 0.9428 0.3980 0.6584 1.0000
Notes: *Indicates emissions intensity (emissions/sales). All vari-
ables in logarithms.
Table 2 reports summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) by 2-digit SIC in-
dustry. Emissions is log-transformed Hazard emissions. Primary Metals and Industrial
Machinery are the dirtiest industries, whereas Leather and Food are the cleanest indus-
tries. Table A2 in the Appendix reports normalized summary statistics by 2-digit SIC for
Pounds, Hazard, and Risk, emissions. Both tables demonstrate that there is significant vari-
ation in pollution emissions, both between and within industries. For example, Table A2
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by 2-digit SIC Industry: Mean and (Std. Deviation)
Emissions Credit Score Sales Productivity
Food 1.85 (3.79) 77.53 (4.96) 16.47 (1.57) 11.40 (0.72)
Tobacco 5.11 (3.97) 75.19 (6.96) 19.49 (1.69) 12.27 (0.24)
Textiles 2.81 (4.59) 76.12 (5.78) 16.54 (1.57) 11.21 (0.46)
Apparel 3.58 (4.73) 75.53 (5.26) 16.34 (1.45) 11.23 (0.39)
Lumber 3.47 (4.25) 78.12 (5.17) 16.12 (1.23) 11.11 (0.42)
Furniture 2.98 (4.45) 75.78 (6.59) 16.36 (1.20) 11.06 (0.41)
Paper 4.82 (4.90) 75.59 (5.93) 16.61 (1.36) 11.36 (0.56)
Printing 2.53 (3.40) 76.60 (6.32) 16.31 (1.36) 11.19 (0.48)
Chemicals 4.69 (5.14) 74.15 (6.26) 15.72 (1.36) 11.53 (0.61)
Petroleum and Coal 5.91 (5.52) 75.27 (6.24) 15.65 (1.57) 11.32 (0.84)
Rubber and Plastics 3.22 (4.56) 74.47 (6.68) 15.90 (1.31) 11.25 (0.46)
Leather 0.75 (6.12) 76.53 (5.76) 16.46 (1.15) 10.85 (0.36)
Stone, Clay, and Glass 4.75 (6.16) 75.67 (5.98) 15.94 (1.38) 11.40 (0.51)
Primary Metals 8.57 (5.77) 74.76 (6.45) 16.19 (1.37) 11.46 (0.60)
Fabricated Metal 7.30 (5.91) 74.42 (6.80) 15.60 (1.29) 11.08 (0.65)
Industrial Machinery 8.25 (6.58) 73.44 (6.21) 16.52 (1.50) 11.40 (0.65)
Electronics 5.99 (4.66) 73.06 (6.38) 17.17 (1.70) 11.92 (0.98)
Transportation Equipment 7.32 (6.28) 72.89 (6.95) 17.36 (1.65) 11.72 (0.49)
Instruments 5.31 (5.73) 73.78 (5.65) 17.17 (1.47) 11.76 (0.56)
Misc. Manufacturing 3.78 (5.27) 75.26 (6.73) 16.27 (1.49) 11.51 (0.68)
Total 5.72 (5.78) 74.54 (6.45) 16.23 (1.54) 11.43 (0.69)
Notes: Emissions is log Hazard emissions. Sales is log deflated sales and Productivity is Sales to log employees
(Labor Productivity).
shows that 6 out of 20 industries have greater within-industry standard deviations than the
standard deviations across industries (normalized to unity).
The mean Credit Score is 74.5 and the associated standard deviation is 6.45 (Table
2). Recall, D&B classify plants with Credit Scores above 80 as being low risk of default,
thus, most plants have Credit Scores indicating at least some risk of default. Table 2 also
reports summary statistics for Sales and Productivity, where Productivity is defined as Sales
divided by the number of employees.
The within-plant standard deviation in Hazard emissions is 2.38, whereas the between-
plant standard deviation is 5.41 (not reported). Similarly, the within-plant standard devia-
tion in Credit Score is 4.63, whereas the between-plant standard deviation is 5.51. Thus,
there is significant variation of the primary variables of interest, both within and between
plants.
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3.3 Baseline Regression Analysis
3.3.1 Model Specification














where p indexes plants, s indexes states, i indexes industry, and t indexes time. Year by






I express all variables in logarithms, with the exception of Credit Score. Hence,  2 and
 3 are elasticities. Because Credit Score is not an ordinal measure, I use Credit Score as
a linear variable, although I explore a number of non-linear specifications as a robustness
check. The coefficient  1 is therefore the percentage change in Emissions due to a 1-point
increase in Credit Score. Because the impact of Credit Score is not immediate, I use Credit
Score with a 1-year lag.31 All other variables are contemporaneous.
I denote all of the explanatory variables as X
psit
. As usual, the composite error term











) = 0. However, it it
likely that, for example, plants with better unobservable management might produce higher
Credit Scores and lower Emissions, even after controlling for Labor Productivity, which
would violate this assumption. Employing plant Fixed Effects (henceforth, Fixed Effects),






) = 0.32 Fixed Effects allows
the random error component to be correlated with the plant time-invariant component, but
31The results are nearly identical using 2 and 3 year moving averages, available upon request.
32To be precise, Fixed Effects refers to the mean-difference model combined with the least squares dummy








). This paper employs both Pooled
OLS and Fixed Effects. Because it is likely that the error term is correlated over time for a
given plant, I use cluster-robust standard errors that cluster on plants.
Figure (2) plots predicted Hazard emissions (vertical scale) over Credit Scores (horizon-
tal scale) using Credit Score as a set of indicator variables (98 dummies ranging between 2
and 99) using Pooled OLS.33 Predicted Pounds and Risk emissions follow a similar pattern
and the graphs can be found in the Appendix (Figures A1 and A2). For Credit Scores less
than 70, there appears to be no effect on Hazard emissions; however, starting around 70
and ending around 80, there appears to be a significant effect on Hazard emissions.
That there is a precipitous drop between 75 and 80 is consistent with expectations given
that D&B explicitly establish categories for risk (for example, a credit score of 80 and above
is classified as “Low risk”).34 Creditors might rely on the categories established by D&B
for credit approvals or for setting rates in particular and lending terms in general, though
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Figure 2: Predicted Hazard Emissions and 95% Confidence Interval
33The figure omits the bottom and top 1 percent of Credit Scores because the confidence intervals over-
whelm the graph. The predicted values are at the sample values and then averaged (average marginal effect).
The figure is similar using Fixed Effects, although the drop is less precipitous, as the regression analysis
demonstrate.
34Information on categories can be found at http://mycredit.dnb.com/glossaries/paydex/.
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3.3.2 Results
Table 3 reports Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects estimations, using Pounds, Hazard, and Risk
emissions, as dependent variables. In all specifications, Credit Score has a negative and sta-
tistically significant (1 percent significance level) impact on Emissions.35 Specifically, in-
creasing Credit Score by 1 point reduces Hazard emissions by 3.1% using Pooled OLS and
0.7% using Fixed Effects. The impact of Credit Score is greatest for Hazard emissions and
least for Pounds emissions using both Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects. Because unobserv-
able time-invariant plant characteristics are likely to be positively (negatively) correlated
with Emissions and negatively (positively) correlated with Credit Score, the magnitude of
the impact of Credit Score suggested by Pooled OLS is likely to be biased upwards. Thus,
Fixed Effects estimates are likely more precise.
The impact of Sales on Emissions is positive and significant at the 1 percent significance
level. The elasticity of Emissions with respect to Sales ranges between 0.62 and 0.99 using
Pooled OLS, and between 0.09 and 0.14 using Fixed Effects. Therefore, it is possible to
rule out homogeneity of degree one ( 2 = 1) for Fixed Effects, but not for Pooled OLS. This
result is consistent with the handful of studies demonstrating that larger producers tend to
generate less emissions per unit of output than smaller producers (Harrison and Antweiler,
2003). Both the Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects estimates suggest that an increase in Labor
Productivity significantly reduces Emissions (1 percent significance level, except in one
specification).36
35The sensitivity of the results to using the maximum Credit Score, rather than the minimum or the mean,
is addressed in section A1.2 in the Appendix.
36Because not all factors of production are included in Labor Productivity, it is impossible to distinguish
between the effect of changes in the production-possibility frontier (technical change) and movements along
the same frontier (factor substitution).
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Table 3: Pollution Emissions using Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Pounds Hazard Risk Pounds Hazard Risk
Credit Score –0.0102† –0.0327† –0.0216† –0.0033† –0.0070† –0.0038†
(0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Sales 0.6334† 0.9902† 0.6885† 0.0973† 0.1384† 0.1037†
(0.0131) (0.0250) (0.0211) (0.0110) (0.0185) (0.0166)
Labor Productivity –0.4492† –0.6127† –0.4004† –0.1199† –0.2018† –0.0530
(0.0286) (0.0541) (0.0458) (0.0294) (0.0418) (0.0416)
Adj. R-sq 0.146 0.202 0.098 0.034 0.026 0.029
R-sq (within) 0.039 0.031 0.035
R-sq (between) 0.000 0.001 0.003
R-sq (overall) 0.000 0.001 0.004
Plants 29,817 29,636 27,092 29,817 29,636 27,092
Observations 248,153 246,324 219,095 248,153 246,324 219,095
State⇥Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry⇥Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All estimations use cluster-robust
standard errors that are clustered on plants. Credit Score is lagged one year. All variables
are in log-scale, except Credit Score, which is an ordinal measure.
3.4 Further Empirical Analyses
One of the primary concerns of identification is the confounding effects of omitted vari-
ables. For example, adept managers might be associated with less pollution emissions and
higher credit scores, resulting in omitted variable bias. In this case, the model would com-
pensate for the missing factor (managerial skill) by over-estimating the impact of Credit
Score. Employing Fixed Effects accounts for time-invariant managerial skill; however, it is
possible that changes in managerial skill might be associated with changes in credit scores.
Other concerns include reverse causality and measurement error. Reverse causality en-
tails that changes in Credit Score are associated with future changes in Emissions, while
measurement error entails that changes in Credit Score are associated with changes in sys-
tematic misreporting. For example, reverse causality would arise if anticipation of future
pollution regulations influenced current decisions that bear on the plant’s Credit Score.37
37The industry by year and state by year effects account for anticipated and realized regulations. Reverse
causality would require that the regulation entails heterogeneous anticipation effects within industries and
that the heterogeneous effects are correlated with changes in creditworthiness.
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The remainder of this section focuses on addressing the problem of omitted variable
bias, as well as reverse causality and measurement error, by exploring heterogeneous ef-
fects and employing additional control variables. Alternative approaches using Lagged
Dependent Variables and Instrumental Variables are presented in the subsequent section.
3.4.1 Heterogeneous Effects
This section generates several predictions concerning heterogeneous effects of Credit Score
on Emissions. For example, I predict that the impact of Credit Score will be greater for
plants in industries with greater dependency on external financing. The thought experi-
ment to consider is whether potential omitted variables might also result in the predicted
heterogeneous effects. Exploring heterogeneous effects does not, of course, rule out the
possibility of bias associated with omitted variables. However, detecting systematic het-
erogeneous effects that are consistent with a priori predications adds confidence that the
results are not merely the consequence of omitted variables.
There are many potential sources of heterogeneity and I discuss the most relevant
sources in, more or less, ascending order of relevance. Several sources of heterogeneity
are not presented because meaningful (convincing) hypothesis cannot be generated. While
it cannot be ruled out that the heterogeneous effects are also generated by omitted variables,
there is no a priori reason to expect an association between the various sources of hetero-
geneity and the degree of bias. In each case discussed below, the predicted associations
with the impact of Credit Score of Emissions are negative, which implies that the expected
sign of the interaction with Credit Score is positive (as indicated in the parentheses).
1. Industry Current Ratio (+): Plants in industries with a lower Current Ratio are
more liquidity constrained and dependent on external financing.38
38Industry Current Ratio is at the 4-digit SIC-level, calculated as the mean ratio of Current Assets to Current
Liabilities for Compustat Firms. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2012) contend that industry-level
variation in liquidity constraints reflects exogenous technological features.
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2. Corporate Ownership>50% (+): Belonging to a corporation confers a number of
benefits that obviate credit constraints. First, corporations tend to have greater liq-
uidity, at least in absolute terms, due to being larger than non-corporations. Greater
liquidity reduces dependency on external financing and affords greater flexibility to
allocate funds across plants.39 Moreover, the assets of the corporation can be used
as collateral, which reduces the risk to creditors. Finally, corporations have trans-
ferrable ownership, which reduces the cost of defaulting.
3. Headquarters Size (+): Headquarters Size is a categorical variable indicating the
size of the plant’s parent headquarters, in terms of the number of plants reporting that
headquarters as a parent. The categories include (i) plant has no parent headquarters,
(ii) plant has a “small” parent headquarters (1-3 plants), (iii) plant has a “large” parent
headquarters (4 or more plants). For similar reasons as corporate ownership, having a
large headquarters confers greater liquidity and collateral to be pledged to creditors.
4. Sales (+): Plants that are larger have more assets to pledge as collateral and greater
liquidity.
5. Public Facility (+): All else constant, lenders might believe that public facilities are
less likely to default. Moreover, public facilities might have access to credit that is
not available to private plants.
Table A3 demonstrates that all of the hypotheses are supported. Apart from inclusion
of interactive terms, the specification is identical to Table 3, column 2.40 The interactive
terms are either indicator variables (dummy or categorical variable used as a set of dum-
mies) or terciles based on continuous variables (denoted T ). The omitted category for the
terciles is the first tercile (the bottom one-third of the distribution). The variables employed
39For example, plants belonging to large corporations are less vulnerable to solvency shocks because the
corporation can absorb shocks to individual plants by reallocating funds across plants.
40To save space, I do not include the Fixed Effects estimates. The results are similar; however, several of
the interactive terms are not significant, while all of the Credit Score estimates are significant at the 1 percent
significance level.
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interactively are also used as controls in all specifications, but only the interacted estimates
are reported (the subsequent section reports all of the direct effects). To summarize, the
impact of Credit Score on Emissions is heterogeneous and depends on the Current Ratio,
Corporate Ownership, Headquarters Size, Sales, and Public Facility. All of the interactive
terms have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance
level.
3.4.2 Restricted Samples
In this section, I restrict the sample to strictly nested subsets of plants. For large corpora-
tions, it is plausible that lenders rely less on the D&B credit score and more on credit scores
that are assigned to publicly-traded firms (e.g., S&P, Moody’s). Moreover, a richer set of fi-
nancial and historical data are available for large corporations, which might be given greater
weight for assessing risk. Therefore, I restrict the sample to only privately-owned plants,
excluding all publicly-held corporations. Second, among the privately-owned plants, I re-
strict the sample to plants that do not belong to a larger parent company. The reason is
two-fold: (1) to eliminate plants belonging to large private conglomerates (e.g., Koch In-
dustries) and (2) to reduce the potential for bias in the standard errors associated with firm-
level shocks. Finally, among the stand-alone plants, I restrict the sample to plants with
annual deflated sales less that $5 million dollars. Narrowing the sample to plants that do
not belong to larger conglomerates and that are relatively small increases excludes plants
that are not dependent on the D&B credit score. Therefore, we expect that each restric-
tion should increase the effect of creditworthiness on pollution emissions. Additionally, we
might expect that a decrease in the standard errors, though the restriction does reduce the
sample size, thereby reducing degrees of freedom.
The results for the restricted samples are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. The
sample restrictions are strictly nested, starting with excluding publicly-held firms, con-
ngolmerates (plants with independent parent company), and average deflated sales exceed-
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ing $ 10 million. As expected, the impact of Credit Score on Hazard Emissions is greater
in restricted subsamples. Restricting the sample to privately-held, non-conglomerates, and
average annual sales less than $10 million increases the impact of Credit Score on Hazard
emissions from -0.007 to -0.012. Moreover, restricting the sample increases the goodness-
of-fit as indicated by the adjusted R-squared.
3.4.3 Added Controls
A common approach to demonstrating the exogeneity of explanatory variables, in the ab-
sence of experimental or quasi-experimental data, is by assessing whether the point esti-
mates are sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables. This approach has been
employed, informally, for several decades and has been recently formalized by Altonji et al.
(2005). The aim of the approach is to select a full range of observables that have significant
explanatory power to account for the full range of observable and unobservable factors.
Of course, employing observables to make inferences about omitted variable bias, as the
authors point out, should be used with caution.
One shortcoming of the NETS is that many of the variables are time-invariant, preclud-
ing the use of plant Fixed Effects.41 Therefore, I use Pooled OLS and Random Effects,
which allows for the estimation of time-invariant variables.
The following sets of added controls are employed: (1) ownership characteristics, (2)
internationalization, (3) firm dynamics, and (4) various plant features (see Table 5 for a
description of variables). Ownership characteristics include dummy variables for Corpo-
rate Ownership>50% and Public Facility, and categorical variables indicating Legal Sta-
tus (Corporation, Partnership, or Non-Profit), the size of the Plant’s Headquarters (Small
or Large Headquarters), and if the Plant is Headquarters (Small or Large Headquarters).
The omitted categories are plants without distinct Headquarters and plants that are not
41In some cases, the variables are time-invariant because they do not in fact change over time (e.g., Legal
Status), whereas, in other cases, the variables might change over time, but the data are only collected at one
point in time (e.g., CEO gender).
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the Headquarters to other plants, respectively. Internationalization includes Trade status
(Importer, Exporter, Both) and a dummy variable for Foreign Owned. Firm dynamics in-
clude plant Age (quadratic polynomial), lagged Sales Growth and Productivity Growth,
and dummy variables indicating Move Often and Industry Change. Finally, plant features
include dummy variables indicating if the plant is Minority Owned, Women Owned, is
Cottage designated, and a categorical variable for Executive gender (“both” is omitted cat-
egory).
The results for the Added Controls regressions using Hazard emissions as a dependent
variable are reported in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. In all specifications, Credit
Score is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level. The point estimate in
the baseline Pooled OLS model suggests that a one-point increase in Credit Score reduces
Hazard emissions by 3.1%, while the added controls suggest that the reduction ranges
between 4.4% and 5.6%. The point estimate in the baseline Fixed Effects model implied
that one-point increase in Credit Score reduces Hazard emissions by 0.70%, while the
added controls using Random Effects imply that the reduction ranges between 0.67% and
0.79%. The Random Effects estimates are therefore remarkably similar to the Fixed Effects
estimates after controlling for observables, and the point estimates are not influenced by the
inclusion of added controls. This suggests that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated
with the error term after accounting for observables.
3.5 Alternative Identifying Assumptions
This section employs alternative identifying assumptions as an additional robustness check.
The objective is to demonstrate that the results are broadly similar using plausible alterna-
tive models. Specifically, I employ lagged dependent variables and Instrumental Variables.
The key is not necessarily that the alternative identifying assumptions are more realistic,
but that the alternatives are different and therefore have different shortcomings. If the re-
sults are similar across a variety of identifying assumptions then it reduces the likelihood
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that the results are affected by one particular shortcoming.
3.5.1 Lagged Dependent Variable
A common alternative to the Fixed Effects model is employing Lagged Dependent Vari-
ables (LDV). The former is suitable whenever the most important omitted variables are
time-invariant, whereas the latter is suitable whenever the most important omitted vari-




psi t 1, Xpsit) = 0, where Ypsi t 1 represents lagged Emissions. Employing
LDV accounts for all lagged time-varying omitted variables, such as capital stocks and
accumulated manager and worker skills.
In the presence of time-invariant and time-variant omitted variables, a more general
model can be employed that includes both lagged dependent variables and unobservable
fixed effects. Estimation entails differencing to eliminate the fixed effect, which implies
that the differenced residual is correlated with the lagged dependent variable. The conven-
tional approach to solving the problem is to use the two-year-lagged dependent variable as
an instrument for the lagged-difference dependent variable.42
Table A7 reports variations of the LDV and First Difference models for Hazard emis-
sions. All estimations use a similar set of covariates as the estimations in Table 3 and
use cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on plants. The first column performs
Pooled OLS using a lagged dependent variable, without plant fixed effects. The second
column employs a First Difference model without a lagged (difference) dependent variable
(for comparison), while the third column employs a First Difference model with a lagged
dependent variable.43 Finally, the fourth column is similar to the third column, except
for using a two-year-lagged dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged-difference
42This remedy is, of course, not without additional assumptions, which are beyond the scope of this section.
For details and examples, see Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).
43Using a First Difference model also provides a robustness check as the identifying assumption is slightly
weaker. Recall, the Fixed Effects identifying assumption (strict exogeneity) is that all "psit   "̄psi are uncor-
related with contemporaneous, past, and future Xpsit X̄psi (where over-bar represents the plant mean). The
First Difference permits future values of the regressors to be correlated with the error (weak exogeneity).
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dependent variable (2SLS).
Guryan (2004) points out that Fixed Effects overstates coefficient estimates if LDV is
the correct specification, whereas LDV understates coefficient estimates if Fixed Effects
is the correct specification. Thus, FE and LDV therefore bound the causal effect above
and below, respectively. Table A7 demonstrates that a one-point increase in Credit Score
reduces Emissions by 0.34% (significant at 1 percent significance level), which implies
that the effect of Credit Score is bounded between 0.34% and 0.70%. The First Difference
model implies that a one-point increase in Credit Score reduces emissions by 0.39% (sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level). Columns 3 and 4 indicate that the point estimates of Credit
Score using both lagged dependent variables and unobservable fixed effects are smaller in
magnitude compared to the Fixed Effects and LDV models (point estimate for the First
Difference is significant at the 5 percent level, whereas the First Difference using 2SLS is
insignificant).
3.5.2 Instrumental Variables
Instrumental Variables (IV) is the most common approach to addressing the bias associated
with endogeneity. For example, changes in managerial quality might be correlated with
changes in Credit Score, as well as changes in Emissions, resulting in endogeneity. The
credibility of the IV approach for overcoming the potential endogeneity of Credit Score
hinges on identifying a set of instruments correlated with Credit Score, but not correlated
with the corresponding error term. This means that the instrument should be correlated
with Credit Score, but should not be correlated with changes in managerial quality, for
example. Because instruments are typically difficult to identify, and the case of this study is
no exception, I emphasize the use of Instrumental Variables as one of a battery of robustness
checks. I propose two instruments, which I discuss in turn.
First, I use the average annual Credit Score of the city in which the plant is located, ex-
cluding the Credit Score of the plant. Plants are more likely to borrow from creditors and to
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establish business relationships within the geographical vicinity of the plant.44 Exogenous
geographical variation is produced from the proclivity of lenders and businesses to strictly
report late payments, or to pardon credit infractions, and the plant’s “exposure” to these
lenders. Since the average Credit Score of the city does not directly influence Emissions
and it is independent of plant-level factors that influence Credit Score, the orthogonality
assumption depends on whether the instrument is correlated with other factors that influ-
ence Emissions. For example, if more-educated cities tend to have higher Credit Scores
and stricter local environmental regulations then the exclusion restriction would not hold.45
Second, I use the range, within a given year, between the minimum and maximum
credit scores. The range will be correlated with the maximum credit score and uncorre-
lated with the corresponding error term under two conditions. First, it should not influence
creditworthiness directly. For example, if creditors use the variability of the plant’s credit
score to assess creditworthiness then using the range as an instrument would be problem-
atic. Second, it should not be correlated with unobservable factors that impact pollution
emissions, such as management quality. If management quality influences the range of the
plant’s credit score then the instrument would not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Table A8 in the Appendix reports the 2SLS estimates using Pooled OLS and Fixed Ef-
fects and Hazard emissions as the dependent variable. All estimations use cluster-robust
standard errors that are clustered on plants. As instruments, the first and fourth columns use
the range between the maximum and minimum Credit Score, the second and fifth columns
use the average Credit Score in which the plant is located, and the third and sixth columns
use both instruments. The first-stage F-tests indicate that the instruments are strong pre-
dictors of Credit Score. In the case where an over-identification test can be performed, the
Hansen J stat (p-value) does not reject over-identification, indicating that the instruments
44Reports from business relationships are also reported to the D&B since businesses often extend credit to
other businesses by allowing weeks, or even months, to lapse between the delivery of goods and services and
ultimate payment.
45Moreover, plants in high-income and more-educated cities might have a greater incentive to underreport
emissions since more of the surrounding population is aware of the reported emissions.
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are not correlated with the error term, as desired. Finally, the Wu-Hausman F-test is not
rejected in most cases (four of six), suggesting that Credit Score is not in fact endogenous.
All of the results have the expected sign and employing 2SLS increases the magnitude of
the point estimates by a factor of two. As is often the case, employing Instrumental Vari-
ables, with cluster-robust standard errors, significantly increases the size of the standard
errors. Nevertheless, the Credit Score estimates are significant at the 1 percent significance
level in two of six specifications, and significant at least at the 10 percent significance level
in an additional two specifications.
3.6 Addressing the Joint Determination of Output
This section addresses two distinct, though related, issues. First, Sales and Emissions are
jointly determined, which is a potential source of bias. Second, because Credit Score might
impact Sales, determining the relationship between Credit Score and Sales is necessary to
determine the net effect of Credit Score on Emissions. As the conceptual model demon-
strates, the scale and technique effects influence pollution emissions in opposing directions.
Thus, this section is interested in “adding-up” the two effects in order to determine which
one dominates.46
One approach to adding-up the scale and technique effects is to simply regress Credit
Score on Sales. Towards this end, I use a similar approach as before, using Sales as a
dependent variable and lagged Credit Score as an independent variable. Table A9 in the
Appendix, column 1, estimates the determinants of Sales, using Fixed Effects and an iden-
tical set of year by industry and year by state controls as the previous estimations. The
results suggest that a 1 point increase in Credit Score increases Sales by 0.13% (significant
46To be clear, “adding-up” refers to adding the two partial derivatives comprising the total derivative of











where z and   denote pollution emissions and financial constraints. I use the terms scale and technique effects
to represent the first and second terms on the right hand side, respectively.
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at the 1 percent significance level). Column 2 in Table A9 instruments for Credit Score
using the two instruments discussed in the previous section. The Credit Score estimate
remains positive and significant at the 1 percent significance level.47
I employ a number of approaches to econometrically address the joint determination of
output. First, I rely on plant Fixed Effects to control for baseline plant size, and exclude
Sales in the regressions. This approach is common in studies investigating the short-run
impacts of exogenous policy changes using a difference-in-differences approach, but it
might result in substantial omitted variable bias for longer panels. Second, I instrument
for Sales and Labor Productivity, using the lagged difference of each as instruments. The
primary drawback of this approach, as many studies have pointed out, is that using internal
instruments presents a number of concerns, which are beyond the scope of this paper to
address.
Table A9, column 3, reports the coefficient estimates, for the specification excluding
Sales from the model. As expected, the impact of Credit Score is smaller if Sales is omit-
ted because the estimate reflects the net technique and scale effects. The exclusion of
Sales reduces the Credit Score estimate from -0.70% to -0.55% (significant at the 5 percent
significance level). Column 4 of Table A9 instruments for Sales and Labor Productivity,
but not Credit Score, and the Credit Score estimate (-0.55%) is remarkably similar to the
regression excluding Sales and Labor Productivity (column 3 of same table). This sug-
gests that excluding Sales does not result in significant omitted variable bias. Column 5
of Table A9 instruments for Credit Score, Sales, and Labor Productivity, using the instru-
ments for Sales and Labor Productivity from Table A9, column 4, and the instruments for
Credit Score from Table A8, column 6. In this specification, the point estimate (-1.53%) is
significant at the 10 percent level and similar to the corresponding estimate that does not
instrument for Sales (-2.10%, c.f. Table A8, column 6).
47The instruments pass both the weak and over-identification tests.
39
3.7 Adding-Up the Technique and Scale Effects
Using the results in the previous section, it is possible to determine the net effect of Credit
Score on Emissions. This section performs a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation using
the results in the previous sections to roughly compare the technique and scale effects.
Using the Fixed Effects estimates, increasing Credit Score by one point reduces emissions,
via the technique effect, by roughly 0.70%. On the other hand, increasing Credit Score
by one point increases Sales by roughly 0.13%. Thus, if increasing Sales by one percent
increases Emissions by 0.14% (c.f. Table 3, column 5) then increasing Credit Score by one
point increases Emissions, via the scale effect, by 0.13*0.14=0.018%. Therefore, it appears
that the technique effect vastly overwhelms the scale effect. That is, an increase in Credit
Score by one point reduces emissions by approximately 0.68%.
The conclusion that the technique effect dominates the scale effect holds even if we
suppose that the estimated scale effect is significantly underestimated. For example, sup-
pose that the elasticity of emissions with respect to output were equal to one, as implied
by a constant returns to scale production technology. Under this assumption, an increase
in Credit Score by one point would increase emission, via the scale effect, by 0.13%, im-
plying that the net effect is a reduction by 0.58%.48 Thus, it is highly unlikely that the net
effect of financial constraints is to decrease pollution emissions.
3.8 Firm-Level Analysis
Exploring the intermediate relationship between credit constraints and pollution emissions
is hindered by the fact that the composition of assets is not reported at the plant level and
pollution emissions are only reported at the plant level. The aim of this section is twofold.
First, to explore the relationship between firm-level asset tangibility and aggregate firm-
level pollution emissions. Second, to explore the relationship between credit constraints
48In fact, the elasticity of emissions with respect to output would need to be greater than 5 in order for the
scale effect to dominate the technique effect.
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and asset tangibility.
Table A11 in the Appendix reports that the typical firm has roughly 14 plants that, in
sum, produce 4 product varieties (8 digit SIC) in 2.4 industries (4 digit SIC). Moreover,
plants within the same firm exhibit marked variation: the standard deviations of Emissions
and Credit Score are 4.1 and 4.6, respectively. For comparison, the standard deviation
among all plants in the sample is 6.5 and 5.7, respectively (cf. Table 2).
3.8.1 Asset Tangibility and Emissions
This section explores the intermediate relationship between Asset Tangibility and Emis-

























where f indexes firms, i indexes industries, t indexes year, and p
f
is the number of plants
in firm f .
The dependent variable is the sum of Hazard emissions across all plants in a given year.
Asset Tangibility is the firm-level ratio of tangible assets (structures, equipment, natural
resources) to total book value assets. Sales is the sum and Credit Score is the mean across
all plants. Additional firm-level variables include measures of credit constraints, including
the Current Ratio and the Cash to Assets Ratio. Additional controls include the Liabilities
to Assets Ratio, which is a measure of long-run solvency, and the Market to Book Ratio
and the Sales to Assets Ratio, which are measures of potential and actual profitability,
respectively.49 The variable #
it
accounts for industry by year effects. I use both Pooled
OLS and Fixed Effects with cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on firms.
49The results are similar including Return on Assets as an additional control for profitability, though miss-
ing values reduce the sample size. The Market to Book Ratio includes intangible assets, which are sometimes
excluded because they possess no resale value.
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The primary variable of interest is  4, the elasticity of Emissions with respect to Asset
Tangibility. Because emissions data are not reported for every plant (many plants do not
release any toxic chemicals), the interpretation of  4 is the impact on reported emissions.
Section 3.1 discusses potential selection and measurement error bias associated with the
firm-level analysis. In particular, p
f
represents only a subset of plants, whereas firm-level
variables are aggregate for all plants. The direction of the bias therefore depends on the
differences between plants in the sample and out of the sample and the direction of the bias
is unclear.50
Table 4 reports that Asset Tangibility is positively associated with Hazard emissions
using both Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects. In particular, using Fixed Effects, a one-percent
increase in Asset Tangibility is associated with an increase in Emissions ranging between
0.36 percent and 0.43 percent. While the impact of Credit Score is similar in magnitude
to the results in the previous sections, the effect is no longer significant. One interpre-
tation, which is predicted by the model, is that credit constraints do not influence Emis-
sions beyond their influence through Asset Tangibility. However, as mentioned, Credit
Score is measured with an error since not all plants are included and the sample of plants
might not be representative. Pooled OLS suggests that credit constraints (Current Ratio and
Cash/Assets) increase Emissions, whereas Fixed Effects suggests that credit constraints do
not influence Emissions.
50A potential source of bias is that the error term consists of the emissions of plants not in the sample.
Since reporting emissions to the EPA is a necessary condition for being in the sample, it is likely that plants
not in that sample generate less emissions on average. The direction of the bias therefore depends on the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.8.2 Decomposing the Technique and Composition Effects
Since firms own plants in multiple industries, the effect of Asset Tangibility on Emissions
consists of technique and composition effects. This section tests the null hypothesis that
Asset Tangibility influences the composition of output across sectors. Rejection of the null
suggests that the effect of Asset Tangibility on Emissions represents plant-level technique































where f indexes firms, i indexes industries, t indexes year, and p
f
is the number of plants
in firm f . The left hand side is the sum of plant sales (output) multiplied by the average in-
dustry (4-digit SIC) pollution intensity. Changes in the dependent variable therefore reflect
changes associated with the composition of production but not the intensity of production
within sectors. The dependent variable is log-transformed and the explanatory variables
are identical to the set discussed in the previous section (3.8.1).
Table A12 in the Appendix reports that Asset Tangibility does not influence the com-
position of production after accounting for firm-level controls and using Fixed Effects.
Moreover, using Fixed Effects, the standard errors of Asset Tangibility are roughly similar
to the corresponding standard errors in the previous section and it can be ruled out that
the coefficient estimates are similar to the corresponding estimates in the previous section
(at the 10 percent significance level). Thus, the results suggest that the impact of Asset
Tangibility on Emissions is achieved as a consequence of technique effects.
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3.8.3 Credit Constraints and Asset Tangibility
This section demonstrates that credit constraints distort investment towards greater asset
tangibility. Thus, I estimate the following
Asset Tangibility
fit
=  7 Current Ratiofi t 1 +  8 Cash/Assetsfi t 1+







where f indexes firms, i indexes industries, and t indexes year. X is a vector of additional
firm controls, which are included in some estimations, including the Market to Book Ratio,
Sales to Assets Ratio, and Return on Assets. The variable #
it
accounts for industry by year
effects. All variables are in logs and all explanatory variables are lagged one year. I use
both Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects with cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on
firms.
Because this section focuses on intermediate relationship between credit constraints and
asset tangibility, it is not necessary to restrict the sample to firms reporting emissions, which
significantly increases the sample size. Only firms in similar SIC industries as the previous
estimations are included in the sample. The primary variables of interest are measures of
credit constraints, including the Current Ratio and Cash to Assets Ratio.
Table A13 in the Appendix reports the determinants of Asset Tangibility using Pooled
OLS and Fixed Effects. Columns 1 and 3 are the baseline specifications and columns 2 and
4 add additional firm controls. In all specifications, the coefficient estimates for Current
Ratio and Cash/Assets have the expected signs and are significant at the 1 percent signif-
icance level. Specifically, the elasticity of Asset Tangibility with respect to the Current
Ratio is -0.041, and the elasticity with respect to Cash/Assets is -0.039 (column 4). The
results therefore demonstrate that credit constraints increase asset tangibility.
Using the Fixed Effects results from Table A13 (column 4) and Table 4 (column 8)
indicate that the partial impact of a 1 percent increase in the Current Ratio and the Cash
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to Assets Ratio reduces Emissions via reducing Asset Tangibility by 4*0.35=1.4 percent.
This result entails imprecision as, in addition to selection and measurement error bias as
discussed earlier, the impact of credit constraints on Asset Tangibility estimated in Table
A13 might not be representative of the subsample of firms estimated in Table 4.51
3.9 Discussion of Results
The empirical analysis demonstrates that credit constraints increase pollution emissions,
even after accounting for the countervailing scale effect. Moreover, the effect appears
quantitatively large and statistically significant. While the results are robust with respect to
several modeling and identification assumptions, the data are not experimental and there-
fore do not support strong conclusions about causality. I therefore consider several possible
interpretations of the results. The first interpretation, as this paper advances, is that credit
constraints casually influence asset tangibility, thereby increasing pollution emissions.
The second interpretation is that credit constraints are correlated with some unobserv-
able factor that influences pollution emissions. While the primary focus of the robustness
checks were aimed at mitigating the problem of omitted variable bias, I cannot rule out
this interpretation. However, it is unlikely that the results would pass a battery of robust-
ness checks unless credit constraints accounted for at least part of the estimated effects.
Moreover, the results are consistent using firm-level analysis and examining the interme-
diate relationships. Thus, while the results might reflect some degree of omitted variable
bias, there is significant evidence that credit constraints have at least some causal role in
generating pollution emissions.
The third interpretation is that credit constraints do causally impact pollution emis-
sions, but for reasons not explicated herein. For example, credit constraints might reduce
51Estimating the models in A13, which includes 108,239 firms, for the 785 firms estimated in Table 4
results in insignificant coefficient estimates for Asset Tangibility due to the small sample size. It is of course
possible to simultaneously estimate the models in Table A13 and Table 4. However, the identifying assump-
tions cannot be convincingly satisfied. The results for estimating both equations simultaneously using 2SLS
approaches are mostly insignificant.
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expenditures on pollution abatement capital.52 While I demonstrate that credit constraints
influence asset tangibility and that asset tangibility influences pollution emissions, it is dif-
ficult to assess the contribution of the asset tangibility channel due to limited plant-level
data. The finding that credit constraints do not influence pollution emissions after con-
trolling for asset tangibility suggests that asset tangibility is the primary channel in which
credit constraints influence pollution emissions. However, it is possible that asset tangibil-
ity represents one of potentially several other channels that influence pollution emissions
and it is the task of future research to disentangle these effects. In any case, the conclusions
of the paper and the policy implications remain.
4 Conclusion
This paper is the first to explore the relationship between credit constraints and production-
generated pollution emissions. Towards this end, I develop a conceptual model demon-
strating that credit constraints distort the composition of assets towards over-investment
in tangible assets at the expense of intangible assets, thereby increasing the intensity of
pollution emissions.
This paper investigates the impact of credit constraints on pollution emissions using
plant-level pollution emissions and unique plant-level measures of creditworthiness. The
results suggests that credit constraints significantly increase pollution emissions–a one stan-
dard deviation in creditworthiness reduces pollution emissions by 4.5 percent. The results
are statistically significant using both Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects and withstand numer-
ous robustness checks, including exploring heterogeneous effects, added controls, lagged
dependent variables, and instrumental variables. I find that while credit constraints also re-
52While pollution abatement expenditures might have more direct effects on pollution emissions, expendi-
tures represent only 3.3% of capital expenditures and 0.4% of operating costs (Becker, 2005). On the other
hand, I find that the share of tangible assets is roughly 30 percent among all firms and, more importantly, that
there is significant variation within industries (standard deviations range between 7 and 16 percentage points
by industry). Thus, a change of one (within-industry) standard deviation in Asset Tangibility has the potential
to significantly influence emissions, as the empirical analyses corroborate.
47
duce output, the net effect of credit constraints on pollution emissions is positive. Finally, I
corroborate the plant-level results and validate the proposed mechanism by demonstrating
that firm-level asset tangibility is positively associated with pollution emissions and that
firm-level credit constraints are positively associated with asset tangibility. In sum, this
paper presents strong evidence that credit constraints have at least some causal effect on
pollution emissions.
There are many avenues for future research. First, future research should attempt to
identify sources of exogenous variation in credit constraints to rule out potential bias. Sec-
ond, studies should attempt to disentangle the effect of real solvency risks on the one hand
and asymmetric information and imperfect property rights on the other hand. While the
conceptual analysis suggests that all factors increasing the perceived riskiness of lending
will increase the intensity of pollution emissions, extrapolation of the results to all causes
of credit constraints should not be taken for granted. Third, future studies should explore
the impact of credit constraints on the extensive margin–that is, the impact on firm entry
and exit. An important channel in which credit constraints might influence aggregate pollu-
tion emissions is by preventing firms that employ more intangible assets from entering the
market. Thus, overlooking the extensive margin understates the impact of credit constraints
on aggregate pollution emissions. Finally, determining the impact of credit constraints on
the extensive margin will shed light on the general equilibrium effects of credit constraints,
which is necessary to evaluate the welfare impacts of credit constraints on the environment.
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A1 Appendix
A1.1 Derivation of Estimation Equation
This section derives expression 19. Let  with various subscripts represent production-
technology parameters. Using equation 13 implies that































Moreover, using equation 10 implies that
ĉ
y
= ⌘ŵ + (1  ⌘)r̂ + (1  ⌘)µ̂ and ĉ
x
= ↵⌧̂ +  ŵ + (1  ↵   )r̂ (26)
Recall that ẑ = ê+ q̂. Using 25 and 26 in 24 implies that


























































































Table 5: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Plant Pollution Emissions (Source: EPA’s Risk Screening Environmental Indicators)
Pounds Unweighted sum of all chemical releases reported in the EPA’s Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) into all disposal media (air, water, landfill).
Hazard Sum of all chemical releases, weighted by human toxicity and disposal
media, according to epidemiological studies.
Risk Sum of all chemical releases, weighted by the toxicity and disposal me-
dia (Hazard), and the transport and fate of the chemical in the envi-
ronment, the pathway of human exposure, and the number and type of
people geographically exposed.
Plant-Level Data (Source: National Establishment Time Series)
Credit Score D&B Paydex credit score, ranging from 0 to 100 in ascending order of
creditworthiness.
Sales Sales in constant 2008 US$ deflated by the 4-digit SIC value of ship-
ments deflator.
Labor Productivity Sales total employees.
Firm Financial Data (Source: Compustat Industrial Data)
Asset Tangibility Ratio of tangible assets, which includes facilities and infrastructure,
equipment, and natural resources, total assets.
Current Ratio Ratio of Current Assets to Current Liabilities.
Cash/Assets Ratio of Cash total Assets.
Liabilities/Assets Total Liabilities total Assets. Proxy for solvency.
Market/Book Ratio Ratio of Market Value to Book Value of Total Assets.
Return on Assets Ratio of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes total Assets.
Additional Plant-Level Data (Source: National Establishment Time Series)
Corp. Own.>50% Dummy indicating corporation that is more that 50% owned by another
corporation.
Public Facility Dummy indicating public facility.
Legal Status Categorical variable of Corporation, Proprietorship, Partnership, or
Non-Profit. Corporation is the omitted category in the regressions.
Plant is HQs Categorical variable for the number of plants listing this plant as head-
quarters. Small HQs indicates 1-3 plants list this and Large HQs indi-
cates 4 or more (0 omitted category).
Plant’s HQs Categorical variable for the number of plants listing the same headquar-
ters. Small Parent HQs indicates 1-3 plants list similar headquarters and
Large Parent HQs indicates 4 or more (0 is omitted category).
Foreign Owned Dummy indicating foreign owned.
Trade Categorical variable for Importer, Exporter, or Import and Export.
Age Year - Year Started, reported by the plant.
Move Often Dummy indicating moved more than once in the sample.
Industry Change Changed 3-digit SIC at least once.
Minority Dummy indicating minority owned.
Women Owned Dummy indicating controlling interest in firm held by woman.
Cottage Dummy indicating private business with less than 3 employees.
Executive Categorical variable indicate Female CEO, Male CEO, omitted cate-
gory is “Either”.
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A1.2 Credit Score Sensitivity
This short section demonstrates that the results are robust to using the minimum and mean
[0.5*(max+min)] values. Because D&B establishes categories for risk, I also employ Credit
Score as an indicator variable for blocks of scores. In particular, I use indicator variables
for Credit Score less than 70, between 70 and 74, between 75 and 79, and greater than 80.53
Table A1 reports the estimated coefficients using Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects, where
the dependent variable is Hazard emissions. Using the minimum credit score reduces the
Credit Score point estimate by roughly 50 percent, but the estimate remains significant at
the 1 percent level in both specifications. Using Credit Score indicators corroborate that
an increase in Credit Score reduces pollution emissions. In both Pooled OLS and Fixed
Effects, the indicator estimates are jointly significant at the 1 percent significance level
using an F-test (p-values are reported in the Table).
53The results are similar using a single dummy for above 80, using blocks of 10, and various
other specifications. One website emphasizes a single category (80 and above indicates “low risk”)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Credit Score
Predicted Pounds and 95% Confidence Interval
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Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects Using Pooled OLS (Dep Var: Hazard emissions)
Credit Score –0.0335† –0.0344† –0.0401† –0.0419† –0.0417†
(0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0037)
T2 Current Ratio⇥Credit 0.0033†
(0.0008)














Adjusted R-sq 0.2327 0.2326 0.2395 0.2366 0.2354
Plants 28,801 28,801 28,790 28,801 28,801
Observations 237,984 237,984 237,961 237,984 237,984
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. T2 is a dummy equal to one if the contin-
uous variable is in the second tercile, and so on. All variables interacted with Credit are also
included as control variables (not reported). All estimations use cluster-robust standard errors
that are clustered on plants. All models include state⇥year and industry⇥year effects.
Table A4: Nested Restricted Samples using Fixed Effects (Dep Var: Hazard emissions)
Excluded Plants: Publicly-held Conglomerate Sales>$10mil
Credit Score –0.0079 † –0.0084† –0.0112 †
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0018)
Adjusted R-sq 0.281 0.293 0.312
Plants 16,529 9,899 6,163
Observations 132,007 76,133 45,489
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All esti-
mations use cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on
plants. All models include state⇥year and industry⇥year effects.
The sub-samples are strictly nested. The first column excludes
all publicly-held plants, the second excludes all conglomerates
(plants with parent company), and the third excludes all plants
with average annual sales greater than $5 million deflated US
dollars.
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Table A5: Added controls (Part I) using Pooled OLS (POLS) and Random Effects (R-E)
(Dependent Variable: Hazard Emissions)
POLS R-E POLS R-E
Credit Score –0.0437† –0.0071† –0.0490† –0.0079†
(0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0037) (0.0014)
Ownership Characteristics
Corporate Ownership >50% 0.3919† 0.6014†
(0.1019) (0.0894)










Small HQs –0.0237 0.0724
(0.1109) (0.0964)
Large HQs –0.1723 –0.2269
(0.1598) (0.1410)
Plant is Headquarters
Small HQs 0.3036⇤⇤ 0.2842†
(0.1255) (0.1084)
Large HQs 0.5497† 0.6796†
(0.1064) (0.0921)
Internationalization







Import and Export 0.7740† 1.2116†
(0.1340) (0.1241)
Adjusted R-sq 0.113 0.113
R-sq (within) 0.005 0.005
R-sq (between) 0.063 0.065
R-sq (overall) 0.063 0.057
Plants 27,031 27,031 28,799 28,799
Observations 223,873 223,873 238,062 238,062
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All estimations use cluster-
robust standard errors that are clustered on plants. All models include state ⇥
year and industry ⇥year effects. See text for variable descriptions.
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Table A6: Added controls (Part II) Using Pooled OLS (POLS) and Random Effects (R-E)
(Dependent Variable: Hazard Emissions)
POLS R-E POLS R-E
Credit Score –0.0555† –0.0067† –0.0484† –0.0077†






Sales growth –0.4602† –0.0685†
(0.0289) (0.0132)
Productivity Growth 0.1192⇤ –0.0111
(0.0676) (0.0247)
Move Often –0.1053 –0.3344
(0.2263) (0.2035)










Female CEO –0.6607⇤⇤ –0.5319⇤⇤
(0.2704) (0.2440)
Male CEO 0.0774 0.1657
(0.1825) (0.1690)
Adjusted R-sq 0.114 0.112
R-sq (within) 0.001 0.005
R-sq (between) 0.069 0.066
R-sq (overall) 0.062 0.055
Plants 22,323 22,323 20,910 20,910
Observations 171,042 171,042 187,633 187,633
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All estimations
use cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on plants. All
models include state⇥year and industry⇥year effects. See text for
variable descriptions.
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  Credit Score –0.0039† –0.0019⇤⇤ –0.0016
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Plants 26,515 25,831 23,665 23,665
Observations 215,234 207,981 183,480 183,480
LDV Yes No Yes Yes
2SLS No No No Yes
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All es-
timations use cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered
on plants. All models include state⇥year and industry⇥year
effects. 2SLS indicates that the lagged-difference Emissions
are instrumented using two-year-legged Emisisons.
Table A8: 2SLS Using Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects (Dep Var: Hazard Emissions)
2SLS–Pooled OLS 2SLS-Fixed Effects
Credit Score –0.0409 –0.1060† –0.0902† –0.0264⇤⇤ –0.0003 –0.0213⇤
(0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0251) (0.0124) (0.0301) (0.0118)
Sales 0.9178† 0.8801† 0.8856† 0.1392† 0.1371† 0.1381†
(0.0268) (0.0277) (0.0269) (0.0185) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Labor Productivity –0.8048† –0.8070† –0.8139† –0.1003⇤⇤ –0.1155† –0.1083⇤⇤
(0.0556) (0.0575) (0.0569) (0.0410) (0.0439) (0.0430)
R-sq 0.051 0.042 0.045 –0.000 0.001 0.000
Plants 29,636 27,806 27,806 26,209 24,510 24,510
Observations 246,324 227,123 227,123 242,897 223,827 223,827
First-stage F-test 801.7 790.5 736.7 875.0 260.4 543.4
Overidentification Test (p-val) 0.214 0.405
Endogeneity Test (p-val) 0.702 0.012 0.025 0.121 0.823 0.161
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All estimations use cluster-robust standard
errors that are clustered on plants. All models include state⇥year and industry⇥year effects. The
Overidentification Test is the Hansen J stat (p-val) and the Endogeneity Test is the Wu-Hausman
F-Test (p-val). See text for description of instruments used. All variables are in log-scale, except
Credit Score, which is an ordinal measure.
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Table A9: Addressing Endogeneity of Sales using Fixed Effects
Dep Var: Sales Dep Var: Hazard Emissions
Credit Score 0.0013† 0.0123† –0.0055† –0.0056† –0.0153
(0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0119)
Sales 0.1446† –0.0024
(0.0279) (0.0372)
Labor Productivity –0.2688† –0.1519⇤
(0.0661) (0.0881)
Plants 29,817 21,694 35,299 23,620 19,785
Observations 248,153 189,566 294,678 210,397 168,315
2SLS No Yes No Yes Yes
Overidentification Test (p-val) 0.793 0.749
Endogeneity Test (p-val) 0.000 0.001 0.066
First-stage F-test
Credit Score 867.7 227.1
Sales 3461.2 257.4
Labor Productivity 283.1 26.7
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All models include Fixed Effects
and state⇥year and industry⇥year effects. Over-identification Test is the Hansen J Stat
(p-value) and the Endogeneity Test is the Wu-Hausman Test (p-value).
Table A10: Firm-Level Summary Statistics: Mean and (Std. Deviation)
Emissions Sales Asset Tangibility Credit Score
Food 5.31 (4.48) 18.93 (1.81) 0.35 (0.15) 77.54 (3.86)
Tobacco 6.47 (2.56) 19.04 (1.71) 0.11 (0.05) 75.82 (1.86)
Textiles 5.73 (5.29) 17.79 (1.36) 0.35 (0.12) 76.84 (5.07)
Apparel 2.02 (4.94) 17.30 (0.12) 0.20 (0.05) 70.14 (7.40)
Lumber 6.58 (5.01) 17.59 (1.26) 0.44 (0.18) 78.32 (4.24)
Furniture 7.72 (6.90) 18.50 (1.60) 0.25 (0.09) 74.40 (4.68)
Paper 9.87 (4.56) 18.71 (1.50) 0.52 (0.15) 75.87 (3.40)
Printing 2.63 (3.60) 16.70 (0.80) 0.47 (0.12) 78.16 (4.07)
Chemicals 10.86 (6.23) 18.33 (1.95) 0.31 (0.15) 73.65 (3.96)
Petroleum and Coal 14.22 (3.71) 18.01 (1.61) 0.54 (0.16) 74.92 (2.49)
Rubber and Plastics 6.44 (6.60) 17.53 (1.98) 0.34 (0.12) 75.59 (4.77)
Stone, Clay, and Glass 10.58 (5.47) 17.81 (1.58) 0.42 (0.16) 76.98 (5.20)
Primary Metals 15.09 (4.61) 18.76 (1.62) 0.36 (0.14) 74.28 (3.62)
Fabricated Metal 12.80 (5.86) 17.76 (1.97) 0.29 (0.14) 74.08 (5.10)
Industrial Machinery 12.10 (6.05) 18.38 (1.60) 0.23 (0.11) 73.22 (4.08)
Electronics 8.67 (5.45) 19.15 (2.26) 0.27 (0.13) 73.09 (4.55)
Transportation Equipment 12.17 (6.92) 19.09 (1.75) 0.28 (0.12) 72.36 (4.08)
Instruments 9.22 (6.33) 18.33 (1.76) 0.23 (0.11) 74.27 (3.81)
Misc. Manufacturing 7.16 (6.62) 17.98 (1.75) 0.24 (0.07) 74.72 (5.52)
Total 10.28 (6.34) 18.51 (1.90) 0.30 (0.15) 74.14 (4.46)
Notes: Emissions is the sum Hazard emissions across all plants. Sales is the sum t and Credit
Score is the mean across all plants. Asset Tangibility is the firm-level ratio of Tangible Assets














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A13: Determinants of Firm-Level Asset Tangibility
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Current Ratio –0.0760† –0.2953† –0.0402† –0.0409†
(0.0166) (0.0201) (0.0112) (0.0126)
Cash/Assets –0.2058† –0.1125† –0.0379† –0.0386†
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Liabilities/Assets 0.0140 0.0434⇤⇤ –0.0538† –0.0059
(0.0171) (0.0207) (0.0125) (0.0140)




Return on Assets 0.0814† –0.0034
(0.0067) (0.0037)
R-sq 0.120 0.149 0.007 0.026
R-sq (between) 0.160 0.146
R-sq (overall) 0.095 0.091
Firms 9,641 6,626 9,641 6,626
Observations 108,239 65,774 108,239 65,774
Notes: Significance levels: ⇤0.10, ⇤⇤0.05, and †0.01. All esti-
mations use cluster-robust standard errors that are clustered on
firms. Asset Tangibility is the ratio of Tangible Assets to To-
tal Assets, Current Ratio is Current Assets to Current Liabilities,
Assets are Total Assets.
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Chapter 2: Are Credit Constraints Bad for the
Environment? Theory and Cross-Country Evi-
dence
1 Introduction
Credit market imperfections are a pervasive feature in most, if not all, economies (for a sur-
vey, see Browning and Lusardi, 1996).1 The result is an excess of demand, or rationing, of
loanable funds, which prevents firms and households from financing investments (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; many others). Investment in human capital, in
particular, is affected by credit market imperfections as human capital cannot be collater-
alized (Hart and Moore, 1994). Due to positive externalities associated with investment in
human capital and health (Lucas, 1988; Moretti, 2004), significant attention has been given
to the role of credit constraints in economic performance (Levine, et al., 2000; Beck, et al.,
2000). However, no studies have systematically explored the effect of credit constraints on
the environment.
This paper explores the relationship between credit constraints and the environment
by developing a simple theoretical model and testing the main results. I emphasize credit
constraints impinging on investment in human capital, which in turn orients production to-
wards more pollution-intensive industries, and promotes greater pollution intensity in these
industries. Two reasons motivate the particular, but not exclusive, emphasis on investment
in human capital. First, credit market imperfections are particularly relevant to invest-
ment in human capital (Hart and Moore, 1994).2 Second, human capital is a precursor to
1That households are affected by credit constraints, even in high-income countries, is empirically sup-
ported. For example, Grant (2007) estimates that nearly one-third of households in the US are credit con-
strained and that credit constraints affect young households to an even larger extent.
2This is evidenced, indirectly, by significant variation in returns to eduction across countries
(Psacharopoulos, 2004), including remarkably high returns in developing countries to programs alleviating
credit constraints (e.g., conditional cash transfers). On the other hand, physical and financial capital can be
collateralized much easier and can be concentrated within firms, thereby circumventing transactions costs
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the development of clean industries, including information technology sectors, high-tech
manufacturing, fiber optics, research institutions, and universities (Antweiler, et al., 2001;
Aghion and Howitt, 1998).Overcoming credit constraints is, therefore, crucial for achiev-
ing sustainable growth based on advancing human capital and knowledge, and the lack
of systematic evidence of the relationship between credit constraints and pollution is thus
surprising.
This paper contributes to the literature exploring the relationship between economic
development and environmental performance, including the environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) literature. The primary explanations advanced for the EKC are (1) sources of
growth, (2) income effects, (3) threshold effects, and (4) increasing returns to abatement.3
This paper is most closely related to sources of growth explanations, which postulate
that structural change transforms the composition of output from resource and pollution-
intensive goods to human-capital-intensive goods. A precursor to this transformation is,
therefore, overcoming credit constraints, especially for poor countries, which lack suffi-
cient savings to finance investments. Moreover, because developing countries typically
have weak property rights, imperfect contract enforcement, unstable political institutions,
underdeveloped information systems, among other problems, credit markets typically per-
form poorly (Banerjee, 2005). Thus, if economic growth translates into improved institu-
tions, which in turn facilitates greater financial intermediation, then credit markets are a
possible channel through which the EKC is manifested. The focus on credit constraints is
however absent in the literature and the predictions are not necessarily identical as countries
with similar income may face dissimilar credit market imperfections.
A limited number of recent studies have examined the effect of financial development
on environmental performance (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Dasgupta et al., 2006; Tamazian et
associated with underdeveloped credit markets. As a result, the marginal product of capital displays very
little variation across countries after accounting for all inputs (Caselli, 2006).
3For a survey of the literature, see Copeland and Taylor (2004) or Stern (2004). Example of papers by
explanation are (1) Grossman and Krueger, 1995; (2) López, 1994; (3) Seldon and Song, 1994; Stokey, 1998;
and (4) Andreoni and Levinson, 2000.
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al., 2009; and Tamazian and Rao, 2010). Tamazian et al. (2009) posit that financial devel-
opment reduces financing costs, including the cost of investment in environmental projects,
and find that financial development and CO2 emissions are negatively related. Similarly,
Tamazian and Rao (2010) show that financial development is especially important for local
and state governments as many environmental projects are undertaken by the public sec-
tor. Finally, López and Islam (2011) show that fiscal spending aimed at reducing market
failures, including credit market imperfections, reduces pollution, which provides indirect
evidence that credit market imperfections increase pollution.4
This paper develops a theoretical model by extending the two sector, general equilib-
rium framework used in the trade and the environment literature to include credit con-
straints that bear on investment and production decisions. The primary insight of the model
is that if credit constraints are particularly acute for investment in human capital, as opposed
to physical capital, then credit constraints increase pollution emissions through composi-
tion and technique effects. That is, because production of dirty goods is physical-capital
intensive, whereas production of clean goods is human-capital intensive, constraining hu-
man capital investment draws resources from the clean sectors, leading to a more than
proportional expansion of output in the dirty sectors and an absolute decline in output in
clean sectors sectors. Thus, for a constant pollution intensity (pollution per unit of dirty
good produced), a decrease in human capital increases pollution via the composition ef-
fect (share of dirty goods in output). A decrease in human capital might also engender an
endogenous policy response, leading to laxer environmental regulations, which increases
pollution intensity via the technique effect whenever environmental quality is a normal
good.
The main prediction of the model is supported for air pollutants sulfur dioxide (SO2)
and lead, using pollution measures from the World Health Organization’s Automated Mete-
orological Information System for about 150 cities in 45 countries. Following the financial
4It is not possible to assess, however, whether the empirical relationship between fiscal spending and
pollution is via reducing credit market imperfections or some other channel.
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development and growth literature, I use private credit as a proxy for credit constraints,
as well as variation in the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors (bankruptcy
laws) and the existence of credit bureau registries. The empirical results demonstrate that
credit constraints increase air pollution using a reduced-form approach. Furthermore, us-
ing a two-stage procedure where private credit and human capital are determined in the first
stage, I find that credit constraints reduce private credit and human capital, which, in turn,
increases pollution. The results are robust with respect to additional control variables and
various sensitivity checks.
This paper has several important policy implications, especially in the context of de-
veloping countries. Because developing countries typically exhibit imperfect contract en-
forcement and underdeveloped informational systems, reforming the legal and institutional
environment, such as reforms increasing creditor rights and promoting informational shar-
ing through establishing credit bureau registries, might represent a “win-win” policy in-
tervention as reducing credit constraints also promotes economic growth (Levine, 2000).
That is, the benefits of reducing credit market imperfections are even greater than pre-
viously understood. An important caveat highlighted in this paper is that reforms must
overcome credit market imperfections affecting investment in human capital, which are
typically more difficult to overcome. Increasing capital inflows through financial market
liberalization might be counterproductive for improving environmental performance if the
majority of households are unable to access credit. Therefore, policies promoting capital
accumulation should be coupled with policies reducing credit constraints to households and
targeting investment in human capital.
The remainder of this paper consists of a conceptual model (Section 2), empirical model
and results (Section 3), and conclusion (Section 4).
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2 Model
The conceptual model elaborates the standard two-sector model with pollution emissions
developed by Copeland and Taylor (2004). I consider a small open economy, producing
two final goods (a “clean” and a “dirty” good) with physical capital and human capital
as primary factors. The dirty good uses pollution as factor of production and is physical-
capital intensive, whereas the clean good does not use pollution as a factor of production
and is human-capital intensive. The model spans two periods to capture the effect of credit
constraints on investment and production decisions.
Considering pollution as an additional factor of production is the standard approach
in the environmental economics literature;5 however, the approach has been criticized on
the basis of incompatibility with materials balance principle (or conservation laws of mass
and energy) (Pethig, 2006). While adding a significant amount of complexity, the stan-
dard model can be generalized to a framework consistent with materials balance principle
by incorporating materials explicitly in the production function, with an accompanying
abatement technology to convert materials into production residuals (harmful pollution)
and abatement residuals (non-harmful discharges). All else equal, a sufficient assumption
to ensure that the physical-capital intensive sector is pollution intensive is that materials
and physical capital exhibit greater complementarity, implying that the physical-capital in-
tensive sector uses materials and therefore generates more pollution.
The model demonstrates that credit constraints reduce investment in human capital,
which in turn promotes production of dirty goods over clean goods, thereby increasing
pollution. The result is demonstrated under both exogenous and endogenous environmental
policy.
5Cropper and Oates (1992) survey the environmental economics literature, which largely treats pollution
emissions “simply as another factor of production.” More recent studies treating pollution emissions as an
input include Copeland and Tylor (1994) and Lòpez (1994), and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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2.1 Production
Consider a small open economy, producing two goods, X and Y , which are produced
with a constant returns to scale technology using two primary factors, physical and human
capital, K and L. Good Y is treated as the numeraire and p denotes the price of good X .
For simplicity, production of X entails pollution, but production of Y does not. I assume
pollution reduces the utility of consumers, but does not affect production.
Production of good Y is
Y = H(Ky, Ly) (1)
where H is increasing, linearly homogenous, and concave.
For analytical convenience, pollution is treated as an input in production of good X ,
rather than as a joint output. Production of good X is given by
X = Zα[F (Kx, Lx)]
1−α, 0 < α < 1 (2)
where Z < F whenever firms undertake abatement and Z = F whenever abatement does
not occur. Thus, Z ≤ F . Similarly, F is increasing, linearly homeogeneous, and concave.
The government taxes pollution or issues an equivalent number of pollution permits.
Assuming some abatement is undertaken, perfect competition implies that the pollution







where τ is the price of pollution permits.
Full employment of primary factors implies that output can be expressed in terms of
aggregate factor endowments and prices
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x = x(p, τ,K, L) and y = y(p, τ,K, L) (4)
Moreover, perfect competition implies that national income can be expressed as the maxi-
mum value function
G(p,K, L, z) = max
x,y
{px+ y : (x, y) ∈ T (K,L, z)} (5)
where T represents the feasible technology set.
2.2 Producer-Consumers
Suppose the economy admits a representative producer-consumer with preferences over
consumption goods and environmental quality. Utility is homethetic and strongly separable
in consumption and the environment. Without loss of generality, suppose the price of good
X is also normalized to unity. Indirect utility is given by
V (I, z) = v(I)− h(z) (6)
where I represents real disposable income. As conventional, I assume that v′ > 0, v′′ < 0,
h′ > 0, and h′′ > 0.
The representative agent lives for two periods. In period 0, she borrows in order to
invest in human capital (schooling) and to purchase consumption goods. In period 1, she
produces the two final goods using human capital determined in the previous period and a
fixed supply of physical capital purchased on a spot market. Further, she repays the loan
with interest and consumes her remaining income. Lifetime utility is therefore given by
W = v(I0) + ρ(v(I1)− h(z)) (7)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the discount factor. I assume all generations inherent an exogenous
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level of pollution in period 0, which does not affect equilibrium choices due to strong
seperability of preferences.
The representative agent therefore faces the following set of budget constraints
I0 = B − qL (8)
I1 = G(K,L, z)− (1 + r)B (9)
whereB represents the net asset position at the end of period 0 (borrowing), q represents the
cost of investing in human capital (inverse of productivity of investment), (1+r) represents
the gross interest rate, and G is real national income.
2.3 Credit Constraints
As mentioned, I presume that human capital is the only asset that is potentially subject to a
borrowing constraint. In general, investment in both types of assets might be influenced by
credit constraints. Typically, credit constraints are generated by the preclusion of using the
asset as collateral (either as a consequence of imperfect property rights or the inalienability
of the asset), thereby increasing the risk of lending from the lenders point of view. There-
fore, because human capital is more difficult to pledged as collateral, credit constraints are
likely to be tighter on investment in human capital. The qualitative results would follow
under the more general assumption that credit constraints are relatively more binding for
investment in human capital than physical capital. For simplicity and clarity, I assume that
only investment in human capital is influenced by credit constraints.
The representative agent faces a borrowing constraint such that her net asset position in
period 0 cannot exceed a fixed fraction of the present value income. That is,










(1 + r) + λB (11)
where λB ≥ 0 is the shadow value of borrowed assets. In comparison, the optimal uncon-






(1 + r) (12)
where tilde represents the unconstrained optimal. It is straightforward to show that λB > 0
implies I0/I1 < Ĩ0/Ĩ1. That is, the ratio of disposable income in period 0 to period 1 is less
for credit constrained individuals. To derive sharp results for the effect of credit constraints
on investment in human capital, additional structure is required.
Producer-Consumer Assumptions
A1. The credit constraint is binding: λB > 0




Assumption A1 is necessary for credit constraints to be interesting and assumption A2 is
supported by some empirical evidence (Layard et al., 2008). I assume that the represen-
tative agent treats factor prices and the credit constraint as exogenous (investing in human
capital does not relax her credit constraint).
Because the credit constraint is binding, we can substitute B = θG/(1 + r) and solve
for the optimal credit-constrained investment in human capital directly. Thus the first order








where the wage rate of human capital is the first derivative of the national income function
71
with respect to human capital w = GL.
Result 1: Investment in human capital is decreasing in the extent that households are
credit constrained.


















whereH > 0 by the second-order condition.
Result 1 follows from concavity of indirect utility and assumption A2. Thus, Result 1
implies L is an increasing function of θ.
2.4 Pollution with Exogenous Environmental Policy
In this section, I consider the effect of credit constraints on pollution via investment in hu-
man capital. I hold the price of pollution permits constant (τ = τ̄ ) to focus attention on the
role of investment in human capital. Because environmental policy is exogenous, pollution
can be decomposed into the so-called “scale” and “composition” effects according to the
following expression
z = ēGS (15)
where G is real national income (scale effect), and S = x/G is the income share of
industries producing good X (composition effect). Because the price of pollution permits
are constant the emission intensity is also a fixed parameter. Thus, a percentage change in
pollution can be represented as
ẑ = Ĝ+ Ŝ (16)
where ẑ = dz/z and so on. The following assumption drives the main result.
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Production Assumptions
A3. Sector X is capital-intensive relative to sector Y : Kx/Lx > Ky/Ly.
Aassumption A3 is strongly supported by some empirical evidence (Antweiler et al.
2001).
Result 2: Under an exogenous environmental policy, pollution is decreasing in human
capital.
Proof : By the Rybczinski theorem, an increase in human capital stimulates the human-
capital intensive sector, drawing factors from the dirty sector to the clean sector. That is,
ẑ = εxLL̂ < 0 (17)
where the term εxL < 0 is the elasticity of output of good X with respect to human capital.
Using that Ĝ = sLL̂ + sz ẑ, where sL represents the labor’s share of national income
and sz represents pollution’s share, the reduced-form relationship between pollution and





where sL + szεxL represents the elasticity of national income with respect to human cap-
ital, which is positive. That is, an increase in human capital decreases pollution and thus
decreases income, but the net effect of an increase in human capital is strictly positive.
2.5 Pollution with Endogenous Environmental Policy
In this section, I consider the effect of credit constraints on pollution via investment in
human capital, allowing for an endogenous policy response. I assume, for simplicity, that
environmental policy is chosen to maximize utility. A well-known result in the environmen-
tal economics literature (López, 1994) is that marginal national income from an increase
in pollution should equal the marginal rate of substitution between pollution and income
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(marginal damage in terms of income). That is,
Gz = MD(p, I, z) (19)
where MD = h′/v′. Moreover, perfect competition implies that aggregate pollution satis-
fies τ = Gz
Result 3: Under an endogenous environmental policy, pollution is decreasing in human
capital.







where subscript denotes partial derivatives. The denominator is positive by the second order
condition.6 The first term in the numerator represents the marginal change in the price of
pollution permits with respect to human capital. That is, GzL = ∂τ/∂L. Recall an increase
in human capital diverts resource from the dirty sector by the Rybczinski theorem, which
implies that the demand for pollution permits falls. The downward shift in the demand
for pollution permits implies that the optimal price of pollution permits falls, GzL < 0.
Concavity of utility with respect to income and convexity with respect to pollution implies
MDI > 0 and GL = w > 0. Thus, the numerator is strictly negative.
Result 4: Under both exogenous and endogenous environmental policy, credit constraints
increase pollution emissions.
Proof : Follows from linking Results 1 and 2 in the case of exogenous environmental
policy and Results 2 and 3 in the case of endogenous environmental policy.
Result 4 provides the primary empirical question to be tested. The reduced-form rela-
tionship between credit constraints and pollution emissions is given by
6 This can be easily verified. MDI is positive since v′′ < 0 and similarly MDz is positive since h′′ > 0.










where ∂L/∂θ > 0 is expressed in Result 1 and ∂z/∂L < 0 is expressed in Results 2 and 3.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
This section discusses the primary variables used. See Table (1) for complete list of sources
and brief descriptions.
3.1.1 Credit Constraints
Two complementary approaches are used to investigate the impact of credit constraints on
the environment.
First, private credit is used as a proxy for credit constraints. Private credit is the value
of deposit money bank credit to the private sector.8 This measure includes credit to the
private sector, as opposed to credit to governments, public enterprises, and central banks.
While private credit does not directly measure credit constraints, several studies have in-
terpreted private credit as a measure of financial intermediary development, including the
mitigation of information and transaction costs and credit constraints. For example, pri-
vate credit is a standard indicator in the financal development and growth literature and
several studies have demonstrated that countries with higher levels of private credit experi-
ence faster economic growth and reduced poverty (Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck,
Demirgüç-Kuntand Levine, 2007). The data are from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt(2009) and
are maintained by the World Bank for the years 1960 to 2010 for almost all country-years
with air pollution data.
Second, following the theoretical literature on credit constraints, proxies for the “power”
75
of creditors and informational asymmetries are used. Theories of credit constraints advance
two main explanations. Firstly, lenders will be reluctant to lend to potential borrowers
whenever their power to force repayment are circumscribed (Townsend, 1979; Aghion and
Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1994).7 Secondly, lenders will be reluctant to lend to bor-
rowers whenever informational asymmetries exists. Thus, lenders will be more willing to
extend credit whenever they know more about potential borrowers, including past credit
histories and current indebtedness (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
These views are, of course, not mutually exclusiveÐboth power and information may play
a role in credit constraints.
Motivated by power and informational theories of credit constraints, this paper uses
variation in the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors (bankruptcy laws) and
the existence of credit bureau registries as variation in credit constraints. The legal rights of
creditors is an indicator variable indicating whether “secured creditors are able to seize their
collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved” (Djankov et al., 2007). These
bankruptcy laws were originally investigated by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), and were
significantly expanded and updated by Djankov et al. (2007). Credit registries provide in-
formation on a borrower’s credit history and current indebtedness to lenders. Jappelli and
Pagano (2002) show that credit registries are important determinants of credit availabil-
ity. Because the value of credit agencies increases over time as additional years of credit
histories are amassed and trust is consolidated, the number of years elapsed since the estab-
lishment of a nation’s credit agency is employed as a proxy variable. The number of years
squared is also used to reflect diminishing marginal value over time.
3.1.2 Air Pollution
Because the theoretical model is applicable to production-generated pollution, I focus on
pollution emanating from production, rather than pollution emanating from consumption.
7The cited studies are the pioneering theoretical contributions. The literature is quite large and there are
many more studiesÐboth empirical and theoretical.
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López and Islam (2011) show that among air pollutants with consistent data (sulfur dioxide,
lead, ozone, volatile organic compounds, and carbon monoxide), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and
lead are the main air pollutants generated from production sources.8 The majority of SO2
and lead pollution are generated as a by-product of electricity generation and industrial
processes.
Data for air pollution (SO2 and lead) are from the World Health Organization (WHO)
Automated Meteorological Information System (AMIS), which is provided by the US En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA). This data set has been used extensively in the liter-
ature and provides the most consistent measures of air pollution across countries and time.
The data span from 1986 to 1999 and include 44 countries and 321 sites for SO2 and 36
countries and 154 sites for lead. See Table (2) for a list of countries.
3.1.3 Additional Covariates
This paper follows López and Islam (2011) for choosing the remaining proxy variables.
I use the Barro and Lee (2010) measure of human capital (L), which is piecewise linear
function of the average number of years schooling. Investment as a percent of GDP is
used as a proxy for physical capital, household consumption per capita for the income
effect, GDP per land area for the scale effect, and an index of trade policy openness for the
price index. Because there is not consistent data for the price of pollution, several indices
of political institutions are used as proxies, including an index of democracy (Polity IV
database) and regime stability (number of years since last regime change). GDP per capita
growth controls for the capacity of institutions to adapt to a growing economy. Additional
controls are discussed in the sensitivity analysis.
8López and Islam (2011) calculate the share of pollution emanating from (1) production, (2) consumption,
or (3) both. The break-down for SO2 is 80%, 2%, and 18%, whereas lead is 56%, 0%, and 44%
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3.1.4 Summary Statistics
Table (3) presents the summary statistics for the main variables of interest and Table (4)
presents the mean values for all variables by private credit quartile.9 For example, the first
column represents the mean values for all variables with private credit less than first quartile
of the distribution. The values for private credit represent the mean of the quartile (not the
quartile cut-offs). From Table (4), air pollution and human capital are increasing in private
credit from the lowest quartile to the second quartile and then monotonically decreasing to
the highest quartile.
Creditor Rights is a dummy variable indicating whether creditors can legally seize their
collateral and Credit Bureau is the number of years since the establishment of a credit bu-
reau registry. For the lowest private credit quartile, 28 percent of countries have creditor
rights, whereas 69 percent of countries have creditor rights for the highest quartile. Simi-
larly, credit bureau appears to be strongly related to private credit. Among the countries in
the sample, seven do not have credit bureau registries at any point during span of the sam-
ple. Finally, private credit appears to be positively related to GDP per capita and positively
related to the quality of political institutions.
3.2 Estimation Specification and Results
The baseline analysis employs the following linear estimation model is employed
ln zijt = β1θjt−1 + β2 lnLjt−1 + β3 lnKjt−1 + χ
′
jtΓ + ηt + εijt (22)
where i indexes pollution site stations, j indexes countries, and t indexes years. The vari-
able zijt is pollution concentration (SO2 and lead) at site i in country j, at time t.
Equation (22) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Random Site Effects
(RSE), and Fixed Site Effects (FSE) for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and lead. RSE and FSE
9Quartile refers to blocks of 25% of the data.
78
control for unobservable site characteristics (random and fixed effects).
Tables (5) and (6) present the coefficient estimates for the dependent variables lead and
SO2 concentration, respectively. Specifications (1) - (3) use private credit as variation in
credit constraints, whereas specification (4) uses proxies for credit constraints. As men-
tioned, the proxy variables include an indicator variable for whether creditors are permitted
to seize their collateral after bankruptcy (Creditor Rights) and the number of years elapsed
since the establishment of a credit bureau registry (Credit Bureau).
Recall the number of sites measuring lead is significantly smaller than the number of
sites measuring SO2, and the samples are not strictly nested. The R-squared is commen-
surate with previous studies, demonstrating that the goodness-of-fit is satisfactory in all
specifications. The R-squared appears higher for the lead model, which might be due to
a number of factors. The RSE over identification test casts doubt on the random effects
orthogonality assumptions; thus, FSE results are perhaps more reliable.
As predicted by the model, the estimates for human capital are negative and significant
at conventional significance levels, with the exception of the OLS specifications. Due to
unobservable characteristics across both countries and sites, OLS estimates are likely to
suffer from severe bias. The human capital estimates for lead are all significant at the 1
percent level, with the exception of one specification which is significant at the 5 percent
level. Moreover, the human capital estimates for SO2 are all significant at the 1 percent
level. The estimates for human capital in the FSE specification range between -1.6 and -3.1
for lead, and between -0.7 and -0.9 for SO2 concentration.
Using specification (3), the interpretation of the FSE estimates for human capital imply
that an increase in the human capital index by 1 unit reduces lead and SO2 pollution con-
centrations by 160 and 70 percent, respectively. Moreover, an increase in human capital
by one standard deviation reduces lead and SO2 pollution concentrations by approximately
0.54 and 0.22 standard deviations at the mean. The estimates therefore indicate that human
capital is an important determinant of air pollution, both in terms of statistical significance
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and quantitative magnitude.
Similarly, the estimates for private credit are negative and significant at all conventional
significance levels, with the exception of the OLS estimates and the RSE estimates for SO2
concentration. Specification (3) implies that a 10 percent increase in private credit reduces
lead and SO2 concentrations by 6.8 and 2.4 percent, respectively. Moreover, an increase
in private credit by one standard deviation reduces lead and SO2 pollution concentration
by approximately 1.38 and 0.49 standard deviations at the mean, respectively. Thus, the
estimates indicate that private credit is an important determinant of air pollution.
The estimates for creditor rights are mostly insignificant, whereas the estimates for
credit bureau are negative and significant at all significance levels. The squared term is
positive, as expected from decreasing marginal value over time, but only significant in one
specification. That creditor rights is insignificant can be interpreted in a number of ways.
One interpretation is that credit constraints are not, in fact, determined by the particular
bankruptcy laws considered. Another interpretation is that bankruptcy laws are relevant to
credit constraints only insofar as credit constraints impinge on investment in human capital.
In other words, the impact of credit constraints on pollution is only via investment in human
capital. Thus, credit constraints do not influence pollution after controlling for the level of
human capital. Using a two-stage procedure (section 3.5.2) and a back-of-the envelope
calculation implies that roughly 90 percent of the impact of bankruptcy laws on pollution
are via investment in human capital, which suggests that the latter explanation is plausible.
The estimates of the remaining variables are mostly consistent with the literature, but
very few are significant after controlling for fixed effects. The estimates for GDP to land
size (proxy for the scale effect) in the FSE specifications are mostly positive and signifi-
cant as expected, although one is negative and several are insignificant. The estimates for
household consumption (proxy for income effect) are positive and significant in several
specifications, contrary to expectations.10 The political economy variables indicate that
10López and Islam (2011) also find a positive income effect.
80
greater democracy and stability are associated with less pollution; however, the relation-
ship is not particularly robust. The remaining variables do not appear to be significant or
have contradictory signs.
3.2.1 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE)
While the model can be estimated equation-by-equation for lead and SO2, the estimates
are in general not as efficient when the error terms are correlated, which suggests employ-
ing seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) estimations. Because the number of
site-year observations with both lead and SO2 data are limited, the efficiency gained from
employing SURE may not outweigh the efficiency loss due to restricting the sample. This
sample restriction might also exacerbate selection bias.
Table (9) presents the estimates using SURE. Because each equation contains exactly
the same set of regressors, the coefficients should not change from the equation-by-equation
estimates. Similar to the equation-by-equation estimations, all of the estimates for private
credit and credit constraint proxies are negative and significant at the 1 percent level, with
the exception of one estimate, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimates for
human capital, especially for SO2, are significantly larger using SURE, which is purely a
consequence of selection bias, whereas the estimates for private credit are relatively un-
changed.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
While the FSE estimations control for time-invariant unobservable site characteristics, the
presence of time-varying omitted variables could bias the estimated coefficients. To mit-
igate omitted variable bias, this paper employs a procedure referred to as added controls.
The added controls approach (Altonji et al. 2005) employs several sets of additional con-
trol variables in turn to reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias. The controls chosen
need not be directly related to the dependent variable, but should be correlated with omit-
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ted variables. An increase in the goodness-of-fit of the model with added controls, while
maintaing consistent estimates of the variables of interest, reduces the likelihood of bias
due to omitted variables.
Because inequality exacerbates credit market imperfections (Aghion et al., 1999), het-
erogeneous effects are explored by income GINI coefficients.11 This serves as both a
robustness check and as a further avenue of exploration. Finally, I employ iteratively
reweighted least squares (IRWLS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
3.3.1 Added Controls
Several studies find that political institutions (Deacon, 2009), financial development (Tamazian
et al., 2009), and demography and income (Copeland and Taylor, 2004), are related to pol-
lution, either as a consequence of promoting economic development or the provision of
environmental services.12 The added controls sensitivity analysis introduces a set of con-
trol variables for each of the aforementioned determinants in turn.
The variables included in the political institutions controls (Governance) include a na-
tionÕs Polity score, which is a standard measure of governance ranging from -10 (most
autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) and a dummy for proportional representation. For-
eign direct investment and deposit bank assets (Finance) are associated with economic
performance in general and investment in particular, but are not directly related to credit
constraints. Finally, GDP per capita (additional proxy for income), life expectancy at birth,
population, and population density (Demography and Income) are likely correlated with
household characteristics, such as environmental and consumption preferences, which af-
fect pollution emanating from consumption, rather than pollution emanating from produc-
tion.
11Aghion et al. (1999) survey the literature on inequality and growth. One possible explanation, among
many, for the result is that human capital formation depends on fixed factors and therefore exhibits diminish-
ing returns.
12Demography and income are related to the EKC literature, which was discussed in the introduction.
Copeland and Taylor (2004) provides a survey of the literature.
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Table (8) reports the estimates for private credit using the baseline FSE specification
and added sets of controls.13 Note that adding additional controls reduces the number of
observations due to missing variables, which might exacerbate selection bias. In all spec-
ifications, the added controls increase the goodness-of-fit (adjusted R-squared), although
only modestly.14 The estimates for human capital are negative and significant at conven-
tional significance levels (ranging between 1 percent and 10 percent significance levels).
The estimates for private credit are negative and significant at the 1 percent significance
level, except in one specification, which is significant at the 10 percent significance level.
3.3.2 Further Robustness Checks
Table (9) reports estimates using iteratively reweighted least squares (IRWLS) and explor-
ing heterogeneous effects. IRWLS mitigates the influence of outliers using a maximum
likelihood estimator for a general linear model. The estimates for human capital and credit
are significant at conventional significance levels.
Next, private credit is interacted with a dummy for sites in countries with income GINI
coefficients above the median in 1980, which estimates the elasticity of pollution for sites in
countries with income inequality above and below the median.15 The estimated elasticities
for private credit for SO2 and lead concentrations in countries with income inequality below
the median are -0.27 and -0.29, whereas the elasticity for countries with income inequality
above the median are -0.39 and -0.94, respectively. The SO2 estimate for countries with
income inequality above the median is significant at all conventional significance levels
but it is not significantly different from the estimate for countries with income inequality
below the median. The lead estimate for countries above the median is significant at all
13 The results are similar using the proxies for credit constraints (not reported). The sensitivity analysis
employs the identical set of controls as the FSE specification reported in Tables (5) and (6).
14The adjusted R-squared without added controls varies across specifications because the estimations are
performed only on the observations without missing data for the added controls. Thus, the comparison of the
adjusted R-squared is for identical samples.
15If a nationÕs income GINI coefficient is unavailable in 1980, the first available year is used. Most
countries do not have annual data for this variable (it is typically calculated from census data); thus, the effect
of income inequality cannot be identified in models employing fixed effects.
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significance levels and it is significantly different from the coefficient estimate for countries
below the median. Thus, the impact of private credit on pollution is more than double in
countries with higher income inequality for lead concentration.
3.4 Two-Stage Procedure
Employing a two-stage procedure achieves two objectives. First, human capital and private
credit are determined by a number of factors that are unobservable and potentially related
to pollution. Thus, instrumental variables mitigates the problem of endogeneity. Second,
employing a two-stage procedure can shed light on the impact of credit constraints on
pollution via investment in human capital.





jtΓ̃ + ν̃i + η̃t + ε̃jt (23)
where Ljt is human capital and Qjt is a vector of excluded instruments and the other vari-
ables are identical to (24). Similarly, private credit is given by




jtΓ̆ + vi + nt + ujt (24)
The predicted values are then used in the second stage estimations using several ap-
proaches. First, I use the predicted value of human capital, along with either private credit
or proxies for credit constraints, in the second stage equation. That is,
ln zijt = ζ ln θjt + ψl̂nLjt + χ
′
ijtΓ + νij + ηt + εijt (25)
where θ represents either private credit or proxies for credit constraints. Second, I use both
the predicted values of human capital and private credit in the second stage equation. That
is,
ln zijt = ζ l̂n θjt + ψl̂nLjt + χ
′
ijtΓ + νij + ηt + εijt (26)
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3.4.1 Selection of Instruments
Estimation of (27) requires a set of instruments correlated with human capital, but not corre-
lated with the error term in (27). Similarly, estimation of (28) requires a set of instruments
correlated with human capital and private credit, but not correlated with the correspond-
ing error term. Equation (27) is estimated using lagged (35 years) human capital as an
instrument for human capital. Longer lags are desirable to reduce the likelihood that the
instrument is correlated with the error term, assuming the variable is not a weak instrument.
The lagged value squared is also used to improve goodness-of-fit and to allow for an over
identification test. The underlying assumption is that lagged human capital is correlated
with pollution only insofar as it is correlated with contemporaneous human capital.
Equation (28) is estimated using the proxies for credit constraints, as well as lagged
human capital. The underlying assumption is that credit laws and credit bureau registries
influence pollution only insofar as they are related to private credit. One concern is that
political economy factors shape both environmental policy and laws influencing creditor
rights. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) argue that legal origin
as well as culture and religion are important determinants of both creditor laws and the
presence of credit registries. Economic development certainly plays an important role in
determining credit laws and institutions, as well as government policies more generally.
Using the number of years since the establishment of a nationÕs credit bureau, however,
reduces the possibility that both are simultaneously determined due to separation of time.
Finally, because there are more excluded instruments than endogenous variables, an over
identification test can be performed to provide suggestive evidence of exogeneity.
3.4.2 2SLS Results
Table (10) presents the coefficient estimates using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Panel
A reports the second-stage results, whereas Panel B reports the first-stage results. Vari-
ables under the Endogenous Variables title in Panel A are instrumented variables, whereas
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variables under the Exogenous Variables title in Panel A are treated as exogenous (reduced
form) in the second stage. All specifications treat human capital as endogenous, using
lagged human capital as an instrument. Specifications (1) and (4) use private credit as an
exogenous variable in the second stage, whereas specifications (2) and (5) use proxies for
credit constraints as exogenous variables in the second stage. Finally, specifications (3)
and (6) treat human capital and private credit as endogenous, using the proxies for credit
constraints as excluded instruments.
The first-stage estimates suggest that the instruments are relevant as evidenced by the
test of joint significance. The robust F-test exceeds all conventional tests for weak instru-
ments. Note that only the robust joint F-test, not the coefficient estimates, for lagged human
capital are reported to save space.
Consistent with the previous results, private credit and credit bureau are negatively
related to pollution when employed as exogenous variables in the second equation. The
estimates for human capital are all negative and significant at all conventional significance
levels SO2. However, only one of the three estimates for human capital is significant for
the lead (significant at the 1 percent level).
Because the endogenous variables are over identified in all specifications, an over-
identification test can provide suggestive evidence of exogeneity of the excluded instru-
ments. The over-identification test is not rejected in all specifications, except for two speci-
fications (2 and 5), suggesting that the instruments are not endogenous. One possible reason
the over-identification test is rejected in specifications (2) and (5) (and not in the others) is
that lagged human capital is correlated with components of contemporaneous private credit
that are not accounted for by the excluded instruments. After controlling for private credit,
however, lagged human capital is no longer correlated with the error term.
The first-stage estimates demonstrate a number of relationships. First, the proxies for
credit constraints are important determinants of private credit. In all specifications, the
relationships between the credit constraint proxies and private credit are positive and sig-
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nificant at all conventional significance levels. Second, the proxies for credit constraints
are also important determinants of human capital. The relationship between the credit con-
straint proxies and human capital are positive and significant at the 1 percent significance
level, with one exception that is significant at the 5 percent significance level (specification
3).
While the point estimates in the first stage may be imprecise, it is possible to derive the
contribution of credit constraints on pollution via investment in human capital using a back-
of-the-envelope calculation. Using specification (3), the impact of collateral laws (increase
from 0 to 1) via human capital on SO2 concentration represents roughly 90 percent of the
total impact of collateral laws on SO2. Similarly, the impact of credit bureau (increase
in one year elapsed) via human capital on SO2 represents roughly 26 percent of the total
impact of credit bureau agencies on SO2. Thus, the impact of collateral laws and a one-
year increase in credit bureau via human capital represents roughly 63 percent of the total
impact on SO2 concentration. The results indicate that the impact of credit constraints via
in pollution is an important component of the total effect of credit constraints on pollution.
This also sheds light on possible explanations why the estimates for collateral laws are not
significant in the reduced-form specifications after controlling for human capital.
3.5 Summary of Findings
Based on the fixed site effects (FSE), the reduced-form results generally support the fol-
lowing conclusions:
1. Aggregate human capital is negatively related to pollution
2. Aggregate private credit is negatively related to pollution (partial effect)
3. Proxies for credit constraints, including bankruptcy laws and the presence of credit
bureau agencies, are positively related to pollution
Based on the two-stage procedure, the results generally support the following conclu-
sions:
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1. The partial effects in the single-stage procedure are supported using a two- stage
procedure
2. Credit constraints are negatively associated with private credit and investment in hu-
man capital
4 Conclusion
This paper is the first to explore the effect of credit constraints on the environment. I de-
velop a simple theoretical model where credit constraints impinge on investment in human
capital, which in turn orients production towards sectors employing pollution more inten-
sively. Moreover, the effect of credit constraints on the environment is reinforced by en-
dogenous environmental policies, which offset the reduction in human capital by devoting
less resources to abatement.
The main insight of the model is explored using production-generated air pollution
(SO2 and lead concentration), measured at over 250 sites across both low and high-income
countries. The results suggest that credit constraints increase pollution via investment in
human capital as well as other channels. These results pass a battery of sensitivity analysis
using a rich set of added controls, seemingly unrelated equation estimations, and various
other sensitivity checks. Furthermore, using a two-stage procedure demonstrates the inter-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: List of countries in SO2 and lead estimations (and # observations)
SO2 Lead
Argentina 29 Japan 57 Argentina 8 Japan 54
Australia 43 Korea, Rep. 100 Australia 55 Korea, Rep. 40
Austria 36 Kuwait 18 Belarus 7 Kuwait 11
Belgium 46 Latvia 55 Belgium 8 Latvia 35
Brazil 101 Lithuania 153 Bulgaria 78 Lithuania 39
Bulgaria 78 Mexico 161 Canada 41 Mexico 72
Canada 44 New Zealand 27 China 39 New Zealand 39
Chile 15 Peru 4 Costa Rica 15 Nicaragua 3
China 344 Philippines 20 Croatia 35 Panama 9
Colombia 12 Portugal 18 Denmark 6 Peru 4
Costa Rica 5 Romania 32 Ecuador 3 Portugal 14
Croatia 42 South Africa 55 El Salvador 15 Romania 12
Cuba 8 Spain 58 Finland 27 South Africa 18
Denmark 6 Sweden 2 France 11 Switzerland 19
Ecuador 47 Switzerland 28 Germany 92 Thailand 21
Estonia 3 Thailand 7 Guatemala 24 United Kingdom 34
Finland 32 Turkey 99 Honduras 18 United States 22
France 148 United Kingdom 124 India 68 Venezuela, RB 30
Germany 247 United States 26
Greece 38 Uruguay 5
Hungary 58 Venezuela, RB 4
India 279
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Main Variables
Mean S.D. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
SO2 37 43 0 12 23 43 430
Lead 0.25 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.28 3.84
Credit (per capita) 8,608 17,287 7 767 2,113 8,585 117,381
Human Capital 2.4 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.5
Creditor Rights (dummy) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Credit Bureau (years) 15.2 23.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 22.0 99.0
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by Credit Quartile: All variables by mean
Credit Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Average
SO2 (micrograms/meter) 35 57 33 23 37
Lead (micrograms/meter) 0.16 0.51 0.21 0.12 0.24
Credit (per capita) 283 1,292 4,426 29,212 8,608
Human Capital 2.53 2.03 2.43 2.67 2.42
Creditor Rights (dummy) 0.28 0.38 0.52 0.69 0.46
Credit Bureau (years) 0.2 9.8 21.0 30.4 15.2
GDP (per capita) 728 3,571 12,222 22,198 9,561
Investment (%GDP) 23.4 20.9 21.9 22.6 22.2
Government Consumption (%GDP) 13.5 8.9 7.2 7.1 9.3
Household Consumption (per capita) 458 2,197 7,240 13,119 5,737
Growth GDP 5.9 3.7 3.2 2.2 3.7
GDP to Area (thousands) 90 196 1,306 4,617 1,523
Openness Index 30 39 46 41 39
Index of Democracy 6.1 5.8 7.2 9.8 7.1
Regime Stability 33 12 47 53 35
Polity Score 4.2 5.3 8.6 9.8 6.7
Proportional Representation 0.96 0.98 0.82 0.57 0.82
Tax Receipts (% GDP) 9.3 12.8 15.1 17.2 12.9
Foreign Direct Investment 1.1 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.6
Deposit Bank Assets (%GDP) 41 40 69 126 68
Primary School Completion Rate 92 94 98 97 95
Life Expectancy 64 70 74 77 71
Population (millions) 741 184 40 70 260
Population Density 199 63 131 200 148
Income GINI 34 47 45 32 42
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Table 5: Lead estimates using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Random Site Effects
(RSE), and Fixed Site Effects (FSE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS RSE FSE FSE
Human Capital -0.214 -0.823*** -1.600** -3.082***
(0.182) (0.294) (0.646) (0.699)






Credit Bureau (squared) 0.002***
(0.000)
Investment -0.209* 0.332** -0.482** -0.460**
(0.119) (0.160) (0.205) (0.188)
Government Consumption -1.368*** -0.292 -0.418 -0.101
(0.151) (0.215) (0.323) (0.187)
Household Consumption -0.348*** 0.297* 2.187*** 2.062***
(0.095) (0.156) (0.719) (0.670)
GDP growth -0.008 0.012 -0.018** -0.004
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP to Area 0.111** 0.077 1.242** -0.129
(0.046) (0.097) (0.621) (0.643)
Openness Index 0.011*** -0.000 -0.010* -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Democracy Index -0.013*** -0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Regime Stability -0.002* -0.003* -0.011*** -0.007*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.444 0.555 0.597 0.551
Observations 692 692 692 759
Number of sites 133 133 133 136
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.000
Note: All estimations include year dummies and OLS includes site-specific
characteristics (dummies for city centre, commercial, industrial, residential,
or other). All prices in 2005 US$. Human capital methodology by Hall and
Jones (1999). Credit is private credit by deposit money banks. Creditor
Rights is an dummy variable indicating whether creditors are permitted to
seize their collateral after bankruptcy. Credit Bureau is the number of years
elapsed since the establishment of a private credit bureau registry. Human
Capital, Credit, Creditor Rights, Credit Bureau, Investment, and Govern-
ment Consumption are lagged one year. All variables are in log form, except
Growth GDP, Openness Index, and all institutional indices. Standard errors
in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 6: SO2 estimates using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Random Site Effects
(RSE), and Fixed Site Effects (FSE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS RSE FSE FSE
Human Capital 0.038 -0.528*** -0.655*** -0.943***
(0.099) (0.140) (0.243) (0.258)








Investment -0.195 0.341*** 0.130 0.068
(0.121) (0.086) (0.117) (0.092)
Government Consumption -0.637*** -0.206** -0.050 0.118
(0.073) (0.096) (0.129) (0.094)
Household Consumption -0.211*** 0.031 -0.011 0.813***
(0.038) (0.065) (0.318) (0.313)
GDP growth 0.017** 0.018*** 0.007 0.010***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP to Area 0.019 0.053 0.737*** -0.545*
(0.019) (0.050) (0.254) (0.282)
Openness Index -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Democracy Index -0.015*** -0.003* -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Regime Stability -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.233 0.221 0.208 0.223
Observations 1,831 1,831 1,831 2,071
Number of sites 293 293 293 294
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.000
Note: All estimations include year dummies and OLS includes site-specific
characteristics (dummies for city centre, commercial, industrial, residential,
or other). All prices in 2005 US$. Human capital methodology by Hall and
Jones (1999). Credit is private credit by deposit money banks. Creditor
Rights is an dummy variable indicating whether creditors are permitted to
seize their collateral after bankruptcy. Credit Bureau is the number of years
elapsed since the establishment of a private credit bureau registry. Human
Capital, Credit, Creditor Rights, Credit Bureau, Investment, and Govern-
ment Consumption are lagged one year. All variables are in log form, except
Growth GDP, Openness Index, and all institutional indices. Standard errors
in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 7: Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (SURE) of SO2 and Lead
(SURE I) (SURE II)
Variables SO2 Lead SO2 Lead
Human Capital -4.412*** -2.196*** -3.467*** -2.241***
(0.711) (0.746) (0.698) (0.759)
Credit -0.184** -0.775***
(0.087) (0.091)
Creditor Rights -0.104 0.006
(0.106) (0.115)
Credit Bureau -0.042** -0.136***
(0.017) (0.019)
Investment -0.069 -0.465** -0.114 -0.576***
(0.199) (0.209) (0.171) (0.186)
Government Consumption -1.004*** -0.539* 0.008 -0.411**
(0.272) (0.286) (0.154) (0.168)
Household Consumption 1.074 1.140 1.536*** 2.777***
(0.735) (0.771) (0.594) (0.646)
GDP growth 0.004 -0.022*** 0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
GDP to Area 0.546 3.037*** -0.687 -0.668
(0.600) (0.629) (0.553) (0.602)
Openness Index -0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Democracy Index -0.002 0.005** -0.005** 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Regime Stability -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.922 0.933 0.910 0.912
Observations 468 468 532 532
Note: All estimations include year dummies and OLS includes site-
specific characteristics (dummies for city centre, commercial, industrial,
residential, or other). All prices in 2005 US$. Human capital methodol-
ogy by Hall and Jones (1999). Credit is private credit by deposit money
banks. Creditor Rights is an dummy variable indicating whether credi-
tors are permitted to seize their collateral after bankruptcy. Credit Bu-
reau is the number of years elapsed since the establishment of a private
credit bureau registry. Human Capital, Credit, Creditor Rights, Credit
Bureau, Investment, and Government Consumption are lagged one year.
All variables are in log form, except Growth GDP, Openness Index, and
all institutional indices. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 8: Robustness checks (added controls) using Fixed Site Effects (FSE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables SO2 Lead SO2 Lead SO2 Lead
Human Capital -0.431* -2.636*** -0.693** -2.937*** -0.485* -1.687**
(0.239) (0.727) (0.288) (0.785) (0.248) (0.678)
Credit -0.290*** -0.572*** -0.298*** -0.247* -0.299*** -0.674***
(0.054) (0.109) (0.065) (0.134) (0.056) (0.099)
Governance
Polity Score -0.044*** -0.010
(0.013) (0.023)
Proportional Representation 1.116*** -0.310
(0.148) (0.189)
Finance
Foreign Direct Investment 0.007 0.059**
(0.015) (0.027)









Population Density -0.008*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.006)
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.534 0.029 0.531 0.101 0.549
Adjusted R2 (w/o added controls) 0.111 0.528 0.028 0.524 0.072 0.522
Observations 1,636 656 1,762 658 1,831 692
Number of sites 267 130 292 132 293 133
Note: All estimations include year dummies and OLS includes site-specific characteristics (dummies for city
centre, commercial, industrial, residential, or other). All prices in 2005 US$. Human capital methodology
by Hall and Jones (1999). Credit is private credit by deposit money banks. Creditor Rights is an dummy
variable indicating whether creditors are permitted to seize their collateral after bankruptcy. Credit Bureau
is the number of years elapsed since the establishment of a private credit bureau registry. Human Capital,
Credit, Creditor Rights, Credit Bureau, Investment, and Government Consumption are lagged one year.
All variables are in log form, except Growth GDP, Openness Index, Primary School Completion Rate,
Life Expectancy, and Population Density and all institutional indices. Standard errors in parentheses (***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 9: Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS) and Heterogeneous Effects
IRWLS Heterogeneous Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SO2 Lead SO2 Lead
Human Capital -0.331* -0.947* -0.632** -0.975
(0.196) (0.488) (0.296) (0.796)
Credit -0.472*** -0.752*** -0.267*** -0.289**
(0.043) (0.064) (0.068) (0.115)
Credit ⇥ High Income GINI -0.122 -0.647***
(0.080) (0.151)
Investment -0.204** -0.800*** 0.141 -0.332*
(0.093) (0.149) (0.126) (0.199)
Government Consumption 0.163 -0.676*** -0.182 -0.553*
(0.103) (0.233) (0.148) (0.327)
Household Consumption 0.624** 1.777*** 0.211 1.541**
(0.255) (0.529) (0.337) (0.686)
GDP growth -0.006* -0.025*** 0.005 -0.011
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
GDP to Area 0.870*** 2.166*** 0.732*** 1.723***
(0.203) (0.451) (0.271) (0.601)
Openness Index 0.004** -0.009** -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Democracy Index 0.001 0.004** -0.000 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Regime Stability -0.000 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.012***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
R2 0.944 0.959 0.216 0.646
Observations 1,686 628 1,643 618
Number of sites 284 123
Note: All estimations include year dummies. All prices in 2005 US$. All
estimations use identical controls as baseline model (omitted from table to
save space). Credit is private credit by deposit money banks. Deposit Bank
Assets is Deposit Bank Money Assets. Credit, Investment, and Govern-
ment Consumption are lagged one year. All variables are in log form, ex-
cept Growth GDP, Openness Index, Primary School Completion Rate, Life
Expectancy, and Population Density and all institutional indices. Robust
errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 10: Pollution estimates using 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables SO2 SO2 SO2 Lead Lead Lead
Panel A: 2SLS
Endogenous Variables:
Human Capital -3.634*** -3.881*** -2.682*** -1.588 -4.805*** -0.412






Collateral Laws 0.018 -0.032
(0.060) (0.128)
Credit Bureau -0.029*** -0.087***
(0.009) (0.020 )
Over-identification p-value 0.475 0.041 0.442 0.579 0.052 0.121
Observations 1665 1821 1663 615 682 615
Number of Sites 265 267 264 110 113 110
Panel B: First Stages
Human Capital Instruments:b
Collateral laws 0.028*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
Credit Bureau 0.006** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
F-test (robust) 26.00 20.81 20.52 16.86 19.45 43.85
Credit Instruments:
Collateral laws 0.126*** 0.286***
(0.030) (0.056)
Credit Bureau 0.073*** 0.105***
(0.008) (0.018)
F-test (robust) 22.29 22.14
Note: Specifications (1), (2), (4), and (5) instrument for only Human Capital, whereas specifications (3)
and (6) instrument for both Human Capital and Credit. aExogenous Variables indicates that variables
are used (directly) in the second stage (not instrument). bLagged human capital (35 years) and its
squared term are used as excluded instruments (coefficients not reported). All estimations include year
dummies and identical controls as baseline model (omitted from table to save space). All prices in 2005
US$. Human capital methodology by Hall and Jones (1999). Credit is private credit by deposit money
banks. Creditor Rights is an dummy variable indicating whether creditors are permitted to seize their
collateral after bankruptcy. Credit Bureau is the number of years elapsed since the establishment of
a private credit bureau registry. Human Capital, Credit, Creditor Rights, Credit Bureau, Investment,
and Government Consumption are lagged one year. All variables are in log form, except Growth GDP,




Chapter 3: Do Tax Cuts Encourage Rent Seeking by 
Top Corporate Executives? Theory and Evidence
Coauthor: Ramón López 
1. Introduction
The soaring top income shares in the United States (the so-called   “one   percent”)   have  
ignited significant controversy in both public opinion and academic discourse.  Adding 
fuel to the flames is the growing sense of incompetence, corruption, and greed, of 
corporate executives, especially in the financial sector, exposed in the wake of the great 
recession. Lavish pay, coupled with yawning federal budget deficits and shrinking public 
services, has generated growing public support for greater taxation on the rich. Defenders 
of   the   one   percent   point   out   the   “big   tradeoff”   between   equality   and   efficiency.1 Since 
economic growth and job creation after the recession has been tepid, a particularly 
pressing policy question   is   how  much  money   is   lost   or   “leaked”   as   a   consequence   of  
taxing top income earners.  
It is well known that incomes are far less equal today than previous generations.  
Perhaps the most cited figure is the doubling of the share of the top 1 percent from less 
than 10 percent in the 1970s to over 20 percent the late 2000s (Piketty and Saez, 2003). 
The rise in top income shares is largely driven by income growth of executives (managers 
and supervisors) and financial professionals, which together account for 58 and 67 
percent of income growth of the top 1 and 0.1 percent, respectively (Bakija, Cole, and 
Heim, 2010). Moreover, because corporate executive pay contracts are inconsistent with 
1The  “big  tradeoff”  alludes  to  Arthur  Okun’s  prominent  book  “Equality  and  Efficiency:  The  Big  
Tradeoff.”  Mankiw  (2013)  offers  a  contemporary  defense  of  inequality  and  the  one  percent  in  
particular. 
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principles of optimal contract design, there is growing evidence that executive pay, 
especially in recent decades, largely consists of economic rents.2 We therefore focus on 
executives to gain insight into the consequences of rising inequality and the potential cost 
of reversing recent trends. 
In both in the US and other English-speaking countries, there is a strong long-run 
correlation between tax cuts and top income shares (Frydman and Molloy, 2011; Piketty, 
Saez, and Stantcheva, 2014). Early studies advanced that the subsequent rise in top 
incomes was the result of increases in labor supply (Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995). 
However, the empirical evidence does not accord with the standard supply-side 
explanation (Heckman, 1993; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012, survey the literature). In 
view of this evidence, an alternative explanation for the relationship between tax cuts and 
top income shares might be greater rents afforded to top income earners.3  
Piketty,   Saez,   and   Stantcheva   (henceforth,   “PSS”)   (2014)   document   empirical  
evidence that tax cuts also encourage rent seeking   (increased   “bargaining”)   among   top  
income earners. The primary piece of evidence is that tax cuts are associated with higher 
pre-tax income shares of the top one percent, both within the United States over time and 
across countries. But, tax cuts are not associated with greater economic growth as 
standard supply-side arguments would predict. As a result, PSS conclude that the rent 
seeking response represents at least 60 percent of the total response to changes in tax 
2That is, pay arrangements regularly fail to filter observable background noise in performance. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) show that that incentive pay fails to filter luck from performance 
despite quite tenable solution (e.g., indexing equity to general market or industry conditions). 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) reach the same conclusion, finding that pay for luck is as large 
as pay for performance. Finally, Bebchuk and Fried (2010) point out that boards fail to limit the 
unwinding of equity incentives through various financial instruments. 
3Tax avoidance, which entails a loss of economic efficiency, is another potential response 
(Feldstein, 1999), though a recent paper demonstrates that the efficiency loss is less than 
previously understood (Chetty, 2009).  
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policy. The second piece of evidence is that the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect 
to top marginal income tax rates is strongly inversely related to measures of corporate 
governance using cross-country variation in top tax rates. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a theoretical 
foundation that disentangles the labor-supply and rent-seeking responses using variation 
in the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect to changes in tax policy across measures 
of corporate governance. The main insight of the model is that under plausible conditions 
both effort and rent seeking respond to changes in tax policy. Importantly, this 
framework provides an interpretation of the link between the quality of corporate 
governance and the elasticity of income with respect to marginal tax rates.  
Second, we use a unique dataset and empirical approach to quantify the rent-
seeking response. Because PSS (2014) rely on cross-country variation in top marginal tax 
rates at a single point in time, the assumption that the explanatory variables are 
orthogonal to all unobservable country characteristics is very strong. This paper uses a 
panel of executives with executive fixed effects, which exploits variation in top marginal 
tax rates over time for a single executive. We empirically quantify a lower bound for the 
rent-seeking response to tax cuts, showing that it explains a large portion of the response 
to changes in tax policy. As a result, increasing top marginal income tax rates discourages 
economically wasteful activities, thereby increasing economic efficiency. 
Also, while the literature finds that the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect to 
marginal income tax rates is essentially zero (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012, survey the 
literature), we find a new result that the elasticity of pre-tax income is actually quite large 
for executives in firms with the worst corporate governance, where rent seeking is most 
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prevalent. By failing to distinguish firms according to their quality of corporate 
governance, the existing literature has missed this important result: Rent seeking is 
dissuaded, at least in part, by good corporate governance. 
We use executive compensation data for the top five paid executives in S&P 1500 
companies from the Execucomp database for the period 1992 to 2005. We follow a 
similar empirical strategy as Goolsbee (2000) and Frydman and Molloy (2011) to 
examine the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. We 
decompose the elasticity of income across various measures of corporate governance, 
using a well-known index of corporate governance–the so-called  ‘E  Index’  proposed  by  
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), among several other measures. Using the 
framework of the model, we find that rent seeking constitutes an important component of 
executives’  response  to  changes  in  marginal  tax  rates.  In  particular,  we  find  that  the  rent-
seeking response represents at least 54 percent of the total response to changes in tax 
policy, which is quite similar to the lower bound derived by PSS (2014) using cross-
country regressions.  
2. Model
In this section, we propose a simple model of executive compensation given both 
endogenous effort and rent-seeking.4 For terminology, we refer to the opportunity cost 
associated   with   replacing   the   incumbent   executive   as   “entrenchment,”   while   “rent  
seeking”  refers  to  (taxable)  income  afforded  as  a  consequence  of  entrenchment.  We  refer  
to   the   additional   value   added   to   the   firm   by   the   executive   (labor   supply)   as   “effort.”  
4 The model and subsequent empirical analysis abstracts from tax avoidance. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 
(2014) find that the tax avoidance response is essentially zero, which we corroborate using the dataset 
herein. 
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Finally, we refer to the costs to the executive of imposing entrenchment and supplying 
effort as, simply, the cost of entrenchment and effort.  
2.1 Set-up 
Consider a firm comprised of a representative shareholder5 and representative 
(incumbent) executive. The return to the shareholder for a given unit of time is given by  
r q w K    (1) 
where q  represents effort, w  represents executive income, and K  represents a random 
variable (noise) [ ]FK  , where [ ]F   is a cumulative distribution function. Prior to the 
realization of K , the executive has some leeway to choose his (ex-ante) level of effort, 
entrenchment, and compensation. However, this leeway is of course not absolute. The 
executive knows that he may be fired (ex-post) if the realized return to the shareholder 
plus entrenchment is less   than   the  “outside”  return,  which   is  denoted  as   r . That is, the 
executive is fired if (ex-post) 
q w rT K   d (2) 
where T  represents entrenchment. Therefore, the probability of the event that the 
incumbent executive is fired (per unit of time) can be represented as  
> @ > @ > @FiringP Pr r q w F r q wK T T d            (3)
As expected, the probability that the executive is fired is decreasing in effort and 
entrenchment   but   increasing   in   his   income.   This   constitutes   the   executive’s   major  
deterrent to increase his compensation too much.  
5“Shareholder”  is  emblematic  of  the executive’s  relevant  bargaining  partner,  which  is  typically  
assumed to be the board of directors but also includes, rival executives, acquiring companies, 
corporate raiders, etc. 
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Let’s  suppose,  without  qualification  for  the  moment,  that  the  cost  of  effort  and  the  
cost of entrenchment are represented by the functions ˆ( )e q  and ˆ( )c T , respectively. We 
assume the executive is risk-neutral, infinitely-lived, and has a pure rate of time 
preference, U . The employed executive therefore maximizes the expected present 
discounted value of lifetime utility given by 
> @
0
ˆ ˆexp( ) (1 ) w ( ) ( )V E t e q c dtU W T
f
      ³    (4) 
where W  represents the marginal income tax rate and (1 )W  represents the so-called net-
of-tax rate. We assume the utility of an unemployed executive is independent of the 
executive’s  current  decisions  and  is  represented  by   uV . The expected present discounted 
value of utility for an employed executive over an interval [0 ]t  is therefore given by  
> @ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ) w ( ) ( ) (1 )E t u EV t t e q c e tFV tF VUW T  § ·¨ ¸© ¹         (5)   
Taking the limit as 0t o  implies that the employed executive chooses his 
compensation, effort, and entrenchment to maximize the value of employment,  









­ ½      
 ® ¾ ¯ ¿
 (6) 
2.2  Assumptions  
Suppose effort and rent-seeking exhibit the following technologies 
( ) ( ) and ( ) ( )A g y q B g zT { {x v  (7) 
where x  and v  represent vectors of entrenchment and effort inputs, respectively.6 The 
parameters ( )A g  and ( )B g  represent total factor productivity. The scalar g  represents 
6Because exerting effort and rent-seeking are qualitatively disparate tasks (or equivalently, 
employ disparate inputs), we have presumed that the cost of effort and the cost of entrenchment 
are independent. This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably and is a close 
approximation. For example, the costs associated with effort include the number of hours worked 
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the   firm’s governance. We assume the functions y  and z  are: ( 1A ) monotonically 
increasing, ( 2A ) twice continuously differentiable, and ( 3A ) homogenous of degree less 
than one. Moreover, we assume the following  
4 ( ) 0 5 ( ) 0A A g A B gc c d  t  
Assumptions A1 to A3 are technical assumptions to ensure an interior solution and to 
facilitate comparative static derivations.  We discuss assumptions A4 and A5 in more 
detail because they have important qualitative implications and are not standard in the 
literature. The quality of corporate governance ( g ) refers to the presence of provisions 
that contribute to increase the controls of shareholders   on   the   firm’s  management   and  
design of incentives to increase productivity (discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
section). Assumption A5 implies that a higher quality of governance has a non-positive 
effect on the productivity of entrenchment inputs, whereas A6 implies that quality of 
corporate governance has a non-negative effect on the productivity of effort inputs. Note 
that the assumptions do not require strict inequality. It is straightforward that higher 
quality of corporate governance limits the possible channels in which executives can 
entrench themselves, thereby reducing the productivity of entrenchment inputs. Perhaps, 
less straightforward is the effect of governance on the productivity of effort. However, 
this assumption is consistent with a number of studies demonstrating that the higher 
quality of corporate governance increases firm value (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) 
and productivity (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
Several implications follow (7) and A1 to A5 
(foregone leisure), mental effort, and the acquisition of skills, whereas the costs associated with 
rent seeking include the social and legal costs associated with self-dealing, weakening 
shareholder rights, and transgressing social norms (Piketty and Saez, 2003). 
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where prime denotes first derivatives, and ( )a g  and ( )b g  are monotonically inverse 
transformations of ( )A g  and ( )B g .7 
Furthermore, as is going to be clear below, the second order conditions to the 
maximization of (6) require that  
6 ( ) 0A f r q w T  c    !
where ( )f   represents the probability density function of  [ ]F  , and ( )f c   is evaluated at 
the executives optimal choice set (the marginal probability that the executive is fired is 
increasing at the optimal level of income, effort, and entrenchment). We emphasize that 
condition A6 is needed only around a neighborhood of the optimal solution and, 
therefore, is consistent with a broad class of probability distribution functions, including 
the normal distribution.8  
2.3  Baseline Analysis  
Given an interior solution, the following conditions follow from maximization of (6) (see 
the Appendix for a derivation).  
(1 ) ( ) E uf V VW § ·¨ ¸
© ¹
    (8) 
(1 ) ( ) ( )a g cW Tc   (9) 
7For example, if y  is a homogenous function of degree 1 1J   then the corresponding cost 
function can be represented as  ( )( ) ( ) A gC g m
J
TT   p p  where ( )m p  is a per-unit cost function 
of a vector of factor prices p . Thus, expressing ( ) ( )a g A g J{  and treating factor prices as 
fixed yields 1R , 3R , 5R , and 6R . The other results are similar. 
8As demonstrated below, the role of assumption A6 (as well as assumptions 4A  and 5A ) is to 
ensure that the objective function is convex and therefore the optimal wage is finite.  
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(1 ) ( ) ( )b g e qW c   (10) 
Condition (8) indicates that the marginal net-of-tax increase in executive wealth from 
wages should be equal to the expected marginal cost resulting in lost employment. The 
expected marginal cost resulting in lost employment is equal to the difference between 
employment and unemployment multiplied by the marginal increase in the probability of 
firing.  
Conditions  (9)  and  (10)  follow  from  the  executive’s  dual  problem  of  minimizing  
the cost of effort and entrenchment subject to an optimal income. That is, the marginal 
cost of increasing effort and entrenchment should equal the marginal benefit, in terms of 
after tax increased wealth. The marginal benefit of increasing income is equal to (1 )W  
and the marginal cost of entrenchment and effort is ( ) ( )a g c Tc  and ( ) ( )b g e qc , 
respectively.  
Result 1: The Behavioral Responses to Changes in the Net-of-Tax Rate 
Both executive effort and rent-seeking are increasing in the net-of-tax rate. In particular, 
the behavioral responses to changes in the net-of-tax rate are described by  
1 10 and 0
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
dq d
d b g e q d a g c
T
W W T
 !  !
cc cc 
 (11) 
Proof: Follows from conditions (9) and (10).  
Equation (11) demonstrates the negative efficiency costs (or efficiency gains) of taxation 
associated with rent-seeking, as well as the usual efficiency costs associated with 
discouraging effort. The former is a consequence of the distortion engendered by 
diverting factors of production towards rent-seeking rather than towards creating new 
value. Equation (11) also demonstrates that the quality of corporate governance increases 
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the response of effort and decreases the response of rent-seeking to changes in the net-of-
tax rate.  
Result 2: The Response of Income with Respect to the Net-of-Tax Rate 
Executive income is determined by the net-of-tax rate and the equilibrium effort and 
entrenchment. Thus, the total response of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate can 
be decomposed into the direct effort of the net-of-tax rate and the indirect effects through 
effort and entrenchment responses. That is,   
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ub g e q a g c V







   
cc cc:
(12) 
Where 2 2( [ ])(1 ) ( ) / ( ( )) 0F f fU W c: {     ! . 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
The first right-hand-side term correspond to the direct effect of the net-of-tax rate 
on income (the precaution response), reflecting that an increase in the net-of-tax rate 
increases the value of employment in the future, thereby increasing the opportunity cost 
of losing employment for given levels of effort and entrenchment.  This effect is negative 
(first term). However, an increase in the net-of-tax rate also elicits greater effort and 
entrenchment (Result 1), which in turn increase income (second and third terms, 
respectively). This follows from strict convexity of the cost of effort and entrenchment 
and that an increase in the net-of-tax rate increases the after tax marginal benefit of 
income. The total effect of a change in the net-of-tax rate on income is ambiguous, and is 
therefore an empirical issue.  
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2.4.  Testable Implications of Rent-seeking 
While the model does not generate sharp predictions about the response of income with 
respect to the net-of-tax, it does generate a number of hypotheses that allow us to uncover 
the various responses. Towards this end, consider the following decomposition of 
expression (12)  
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
q g g
uV b g e q a g cg





     
cc cc: : :
 (13) 
Expression (13) decomposes the response of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate 
into the (net) effort response ( qH (g)) and rent-seeking response ( ( )gTH ). Conceptually, 
these responses represent the partial income response to changes in taxes derived from 
the net behavioral and precautionary responses of effort and entrenchment.  
Result 3: Corporate Governance and the Response of Income to Taxes 
The quality of corporate governance decreases the rent-seeking response, whereas the 








Proof: Follows from (13).  
Result 3 demonstrates that, while the net effect of governance is ambiguous, the effects 
on the rent-seeking and effort responses are unambiguous. This generates a number of 
particular testable hypotheses. One particular testable hypothesis is what we refer to as 
the pure efficiency hypothesis, which is the following  
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The Pure Efficiency (PE) Hypothesis: Executives do not seek rents and, therefore, only 
effort responds to changes in the net-of-tax rate, which implies that the response of 
income is given by  
( ) ( )qg gH V H    (15) 
The   PE   hypothesis   results   in   sharp   predictions   for   the   relationship   between   firm’s  
corporate governance and the response of income with respect to taxes.  
PE Testable Implication: The response of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 








Under the PE hypothesis, the response of income with respect to the net-of-tax is 
increasing in the quality of corporate governance because effort inputs are more 
productive. Figure 1 illustrates the PE hypothesis, where the upward-sloping  “Pure  Effort  
Response”   curve   represents   the   relationship   between   the   response   of   income   and   the  
quality of corporate governance.  
A pure rent-seeking hypothesis can also be formulated, where only rent-seeking 
responds to the changes in tax policy. This case would be represented by the downward-
sloping   “Pure  Rent-seeking  Response”   curve.  Note   that  we   cannot,   a   priori,   rule   out   a  
negative income response, indicated by the curves below the x-axis, but this does not 
impinge on generating testable hypotheses.  
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Figure 1. Pure Effort and Pure Rent-seeking Responses 
A rejection of the PE hypothesis indicates that rent seeking is an important component of 
income. However, the hypothesis test cannot determine the quantitative significance of 
the rent-seeking response. Towards this end, we derive a more general framework for 
uncovering the rent-seeking response, which yields a lower-bound estimate.  
Consider two discrete points in the quality of corporate governance continuum, 
g g . The following implication provides a lower bound estimate for the net rent-
seeking response.  
Rent-seeking Testable Implication: 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )q qg g g g g g g gT TH H H H H H H H     !      (17) 
Expression (17) follows from the observation that ( ) 0gTH !  and ( ) ( ) 0q qg gH H ! . The 
rent-seeking testable implication demonstrates that if g g  implies ( ) ( )g gH H!  
then ( ) 0gTH ! .  In other words, if the response of income with respect to taxes is 
decreasing in the quality of corporate governance then the rent-seeking response must be 
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strictly positive. This is satisfied whenever the observed relationship between H  and g  is 
sloping downward (see Figure 1). Moreover, if we let g  represent the minimum element 
of g  then following expression represents a lower bound for the rent-seeking response 
for a given g gd   
( ) ( ) ( )g g gTH H H!   (18) 
Because ( ) ( )g gH H  can be estimated, expression (18) can be used to estimate a lower 
bound rent-seeking response. If it is observed that ( ) ( )g gH Hd  then the rent-seeking 
response is either indistinguishable from zero or not sufficiently large to detect, but 
( ) ( )g gH Ht  indicates that the rent-seeking response exceeds a strictly-positive lower 
bound.  
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. Data Sources 
Compensation of the five highest-paid   employees   for   the   Standard   and   Poor’s   (S&P)  
1500 corporations are provided by Execucomp database, spanning from 1992 to 2011. 
This is a panel data of executives including detailed components of compensation. Also, 
Compustat North America, which includes the Execucomp database, contains various 
firm-level financial variables.9  
We also employ firm-level corporate governance data compiled by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRCC) and provided by Riskmetrics. The IRCC 
Takeover Defense database has been used to construct several corporate governance 
indicators, the most well-known being the so-called   “Governance   Index”   (henceforth,  
9See Goolsbee (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the data, which are used extensively. 
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GIM   Index)   by   Gompers,   Metrick,   and   Ishii   (2003)   and   the   “Entrenchment   Index”  
(henceforth, E Index) by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), the latter refined the 
former twenty-four provisions composing the GIM Index to six key indicators. We focus 
primarily, but not exclusively, on the E Index because, as discussed by the authors, 
several provisions are superfluous. The data span from 1990 to 2006 for 1500 large firms, 
which is a slightly smaller universe than the Compustat dataset. Finally, we use the 
TAXSIM Model to simulate maximum marginal tax rates across states and across time, 
accounting for the combined effect of federal and state taxes.10  
3.2 Tax Policy and Accounting for Tax Rates 
From 1993 to 2003, a number of federal tax acts increased, and then decreased, marginal 
tax rates, along with changes at the state level, which can be used to identify the elasticity 
of taxable income. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised the top 
marginal income tax rate (for married, joint filers with taxable income greater than 
$250,000) from 31 percent to 39.6 percent. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 contained a number of tax provisions that were phased in over 
several years. Many of the tax reductions were designed to be enacted over the course of 
up to 9 years; however, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
accelerated the reductions for 2004 and 2006, which were retroactively enacted to apply 
to the 2003 tax year. On July 1, 2001 and January 1, 2002, the year 2000 income rates 
(28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent) were reduced by 0.5 percentage points, reducing each rate 
by 1 percentage point. More reductions were scheduled for the beginning of 2004 and 
10Table 1 defines all of the variables used and provides their respective. A more detailed 
discussion of the aforementioned data is available in the discussion paper, Andersen and López 
(2012).  
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2006, reducing the top rate by an additional 2.6 percentage points and the next three rates 
by an additional 2 percentage points. The 2003 tax cut accelerated these reductions, 
thereby, lowering the rates to 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent, which were effective for 2003 
tax year. All of the reduced rates have been in effect until 2012.  
One of the drawbacks of using the Execucomp database, rather than tax return 
data, is that we cannot observe all components of total taxable income, including capital 
gains income, income of the spouse, and tax deductions. We follow the conventional 
approach in calculating earned income, which assumes that all executives are married and 
file joint income tax returns, and have no household income outside the firm. While 
several, or even most, studies rely on variation in federal marginal tax rates (Goolsbee, 
2000; Frydman and Molloy, 2011), we follow several more recent studies using variation 
in state tax rates, as well as federal rates (Nada and Giertz, 2006; Katuscák, 2009), using 
the TAXSIM Model simulator.  
To circumvent the problem of endogenous tax rates for individuals around the tax 
bracket cutoffs, we follow previous studies (Goolsbee, 2000; Nada and Giertz, 2006) that 
exclude executives with permanent income below the top-bracket, where permanent 
income is defined as the mean income in the sample.11 In particular, we follow Nada and 
Giertz (2006) and exclude executives whom have permanent income less than $400,000 
(in 2006 dollars).12  
11Of course, permanent income might also be endogenous and limiting the sample might bias the 
results. For consistency with the literature and to maintain the focus of the paper, we rely on 
Goolsbee (2000), who addresses these issues and finds that the results are insensitive to various 
cutoffs and tax rate definitions. 
12Nada and Giertz (2006) claim to use the same cutoff (after adjusting for inflation) as Goolsbee 
(2000), using $376,000 in 2004$, which is roughly $399,000 in 2006$. 
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3.3  Executive Compensation and Firm Data 
We focus on taxable income, which is comprised of the following components: salary, 
bonus, options exercised (ISOs and NQSOs), long-term incentive payouts (LTIP), and 
restricted stock grants. We also disaggregate taxable income and look at the effect of tax 
rates on salary and bonus and options exercised separately, as well the effect on 
compensation including non-taxable income. In general, all forms of taxable income are 
taxed at the personal earned income tax rate, except for Incentive Stock Options (ISOs), 
which are taxed at the capital gains rate upon sale. ISOs, unlike Nonqualified Stock 
Options (NQSOs), are not deductible against corporate profits and have an annual cap of 
$100,000 per-executive and, therefore, represent roughly 5 percent of options exercised. 
As conventional, we assume all options exercised are NQSOs. (See Hall and Liebman 
(2000) for a detailed discussion of the taxation of executive compensation.) Following 
Frydman and Molloy (2011), we control for firm-specific variables including market 
value, sales, leverage, and market-to-book ratio. To properly account for firm-level data 
and tax rates, it is necessary to omit firms with fiscal years straddling more than one year 
(i.e., firms with fiscal years not ending in December), which excludes about 40 percent of 
the observations.13  
In addition to the usual set of controls employed in estimating the elasticity of 
taxable income, we also account for the degree in which the internal institutions of the 
firm favor the executive vis-à-vis shareholders–both as a determinant of taxable income 
and as a determinant of the elasticity of taxable income (interactive effect). This 
13The assumptions concerning ISOs and excluding firms with fiscal years not ending in December 
pertain to all studies cited here. Typically, firms have fiscal years not ending in December to 
avoid having accounting deadlines coincide with periods of high business activity (e.g., retail 
sales). As far as we know, no studies have attempted to assess or remedy this shortcoming.  
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corresponds of course to the inverse of the variable quality of corporate governance (g) 
used in the theoretical analysis. We thus include the so-called E Index proposed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), which is a categorical variable ranging, in ascending 
(descending) order in which the institutions of the firm favor executives (shareholders), 
from 0 to 6 based on the number of takeover defense provisions in place.14 The GIM 
index, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), follows a similar methodology, 
using an additional eighteen (thus, twenty-four in total) defense provisions, which are 
closely related to the provisions included in the E index, but also including six state laws 
related to corporate governance. The GIM index and, more recently, the E index have 
been extensively used and it has been empirically demonstrated that shareholder rights 
are positively related to higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, and lower 
capital expenditures. The role of institutions in the response of taxable income to changes 
in the net-of-tax rate, however, have not been explored.  
3.4. Summary Statistics 
Starting in 2006, the reporting of several Execucomp variables changed significantly and, 
starting in 2007, the variables needed to create the GIM and E index were no longer 
collected. Thus, we use data spanning from 1992 to 2005 (the limitation is not 
particularly unfavorable because there were no major changes in the federal tax code 
after 2004).15 Before imposing any qualifications, the data contain 71,912 executive-year 
14The six provisions include (1) staggered boards (directors are elected in overlapping terms, 
rather than  simultaneously),  (2)  limitation  on  shareholders’  ability  to  amend  corporate  bylaws  
through  majority  voting,  (3)  limitation  on  shareholders’  ability  to  amend  the  corporate  charter,  (4)  
supermajority shareholder vote to approve a merger, (5) golden parachute (severance agreement 
providing benefits to executive in event of firing or change of control), and (6) poison pill 
(shareholder right that renders the company unattractive to a potential acquirer). 
15The data necessary to create the GIM and E index are only available for the years 1993, 95, 98, 
00, 02, 04, and 06. We use lagged variables in missing years, except for 1992 and 1997 we use 93 
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observations. After eliminating executives with permanent income below $400,000, at 
firms with fiscal years not ending in December, at firms without E Index data, or missing 
state residency data (therefore, we cannot assign a marginal tax rate), reduces the sample 
to 31,297. Executives are observed in the sample for 8 years on average, with a standard 
deviation of 3.7 years.  
Table (2) reports summary statistics by E Index quartiles.16 The average taxable 
income in the sample is $2.4 million and the median taxable income is $989,000, 
indicating that the distribution is highly skewed. The relationship between E Index and 
taxable income appears negative–the lowest E Index quartile has the highest average 
taxable income ($3.3 million), whereas the highest and second highest quartiles have the 
lowest average taxable income (approximately $2 million). Median taxable income, 
however, exhibits markedly less variation across E Index quartiles ($1.15 million is the 
maximum, whereas $0.90 is the minimum).  
Table (2) also reports firm attributes by E Index quartiles. The relationship 
between the E Index and firm size is clearly negative–the average market value of the 
lowest E Index quartile is more than four times greater than the market value of the 
highest E Index quartile. The median values display less variation across quartiles, 
indicating that, similar to taxable income, the distribution of market value is highly 
skewed. The market-to-book  ratio  is  also  positively  related  to  a  firm’s  E  Index,  indicating  
and 98 data, respectively. The results are robust to using only non-imputed values; however, the 
long-run elasticity of taxable income cannot be estimated without continuous years. This is 
further discussedin the robustness checks. 
16We use quartiles rather than indices because several indices have very few observations (less 
than 1 percent of observations have E Index equal to six). E Index quartiles correspond to E 
Indices 0-1 (7,712 observations), 2 (7238 observations), 3 (8957 observations), and 4-6 (7390 
observations).  
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that firms with lower E Indices have greater growth potential than firms with higher E 
Indices.  
3.5. Regression Analysis 
To estimate the elasticity of taxable income, we use the following modified version of the 
standard specification17 
     ln( ) (ln(1 ) )Income
j j
i t i j i t i t j j i t j i t i t
E E E E
I{E E } I{E E } XD E W G     
 
   u     *¦ ¦  (19) 
where i  indexes executives and t  indexes time. The variable iD  represents executive-
firm fixed effects, i tX   represents firm-specific variables (market value, sales, leverage, 
and market-to-book ratio in the previous period) and time-specific variables (time trend 
or year dummies) and i t  represents a random component. The variable (1- )i tW   
represents the net-of-tax rate, where i tW   is the maximum combined federal and state 
marginal tax rate. i t jI{E E }   is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive belongs 
to a firm with an E Index belonging to the jE  and 0 if otherwise.
18 Recall, the E Index is 
decreasing in the quality of corporate governance. The coefficient jE , therefore, 
represents the elasticity of taxable income for an executive belonging to a firm with E 
Index quantile jE . The baseline model uses E Index quartiles (identical to summary 
statistics).19  
3.5.1. Regression Results 
17 The standard specification to estimate the elasticity of taxable income takes the form: 
ln( ) ln(1 )Incomei t i i t i t i tXD E W       *  
18We use dummy variables for E Index to account for potential non-linear relationships. 
19That is, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6jE E {{ } { } {       }  
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Table (3) reports the regression results for estimating the elasticity of various forms of 
compensation with respect to the net-of-tax rate.   Henceforth,   “specification”   refers   to  
empirical specifications corresponding to columns in the tables (not equation numbers). 
Specification (1) estimates the standard specification, without controlling for E Index 
quartiles. The estimated (short-run) elasticity of taxable income for the entire sample is 
significant at the 1 percent significance level. Specification (2) indicates that the elasticity 
of income greatly varies significantly across E Index quartiles. Moreover, the relationship 
between the elasticity of taxable income and E Index quartiles appears to be 
monotonically increasing. A Wald-type test rejects the null hypothesis that the elasticities 
among each pair of quartiles are equal.20  
The elasticity of other forms of compensation follow a similar pattern as taxable 
income, although varying in magnitude as expected. In particular, the dependent variable 
Total Pay, which includes taxable income and other (non-taxable) compensation, are 
similar to the estimates for the elasticity of taxable income. As expected, the elasticity of 
Salary and Bonus (Cash) compensation is relatively small compared to the elasticity of 
exercised stock options (Options), which is quite large. As mentioned, non-performance-
based compensation (including Salary and Bonus) in excess of $1 million cannot be 
deducted from corporate profits, thus marginal increases in compensation are typically 
incentive-based pay (predominately options), reflecting their relative tax advantage.  
As pointed out by Goolsbee (2000) and Hall and Liebman (2000), 
contemporaneous or short run responses to the net-of-tax rate may represent income 
shifting   over   time   rather   than   “permanent”   responses.  Using   the   contemporaneous   and  
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future net-of-tax rate is the standard approach to allowing individuals to anticipate as well 
as react to tax changes.21 If anticipation is important then the forward net-of-tax rate 
should be negatively related to current taxable income; that is, future tax increases should 
increase current taxable income. The sum of the short-run (contemporaneous) and the 
anticipation elasticity represents the long-run (or at least non-transitory) response to 
changes in the net-of-tax rate. Certainly this is an important consideration to explore 
here–it may be that pro-executive institutions (higher E Index) only afford greater 
discretion in the timing, rather than level, response to changes in the net-of-tax rate. 
Specification (7) indicates that the anticipatory responses are remarkably similar 
for all quartiles; however, the contemporaneous elasticities remain larger for higher 
quartiles. The long-run elasticity of taxable income to changes in the net-of-tax rate for 
all executives is approximately 0.5 (specification 6), which is within the range of 
estimates in the literature, and ranges between 0.04 for executives with the lowest E 
Index and 0.8 for executives with the highest E Index. While the average elasticity is 
relatively low and in fact almost negligible for executives in firms with good corporate 
governance, it is quite large for executives in firms with the worst corporate governance, 
reaching a value that is 20 times larger than the elasticity in firms with good corporate 
governance. This is an important result so far ignored in the literature.  A Wald-type test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the long-run elasticities among each pair of quartiles are 
equal. 
21Using the forward net-of-tax rate is problematic for a number of reasons; however, we follow 
the conventional approach because remedying these problems is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The primary objective is not necessarily to determine precise long-run estimates, but to show that 
the differences in the short-run elasticities (which are measured more precisely) are not merely a 
reflection of differences in timing. 
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These results are even more pronounced when we employ the federal, rather than 
state-specific, net-of-tax rates, which are reported in specification (8).22  
3.6 Testing Alternative Measures of Governance 
To corroborate the results in the previous section, this section employs alternative 
measures of corporate governance. First, we use executive equity at stake, which is a 
common measure of governance in the literature as it measures the degree in which the 
incentives of managers and shareholders are aligned. As pointed out by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), there are many mechanisms through which value-adding incentives can 
be achieved; however, the primary mechanisms are ownership of stock and stock options. 
Following Baker and Hall (2004), we calculate the (equivalent) shares owned from the 
number of shares and unexercised stock options held by the executive. We refer to the 
change in executive wealth from all stocks and unexercised stock options held from a 
$1000 change in firm value as the Jensen-Murphy statistic (JMS). Similarly, we refer to 
the  change  in  executive’s  wealth  from  all  stocks  and  unexercised  stock  options  held  from  
a 1 percent change in firm value as Equity-at-stake (EAS).23 Table (2) summarizes the 
JMS and EAS by E Index quartile. For all E Index quartiles, the value of stocks and stock 
options increases by $9.58 on average whenever the value of the firm increases by $1000, 
whereas the median value increases by $2.35. Similarly, the average EAS is $0.20 and 
the median is $0.05. The median summary statistics for the JMS and EAS by E Index 
quartiles indicate that there appears to be little relationship between wealth sensitivity and 
22Using federal tax rates entails losing fewer variables and overcomes possible endogeneity 
resulting in executives moving across state borders.  
23Whether the Jensen-Murphy Statistic or Equity-at-stake is more important for value-adding 
incentives depends on whether the marginal product of effort is constant across firm size or 
increasing with firm size, thus we include both (the former (latter) implies the Jensen-Murphy 
statistic (Equity-at-stake) is more important). 
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E Index quartiles, and certainly variation within quartiles are more important than 
variation between quartiles, which suggests that the two testable hypothesis are more or 
less independent.  
We also employ measures of the presence of large institutional investors and the 
equity ownership of the board of directors as alternative measures of the institutions of 
the firm. In particular, following Gillian, Hartzell, and Starks (2003), we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of institutional ownership concentration, and following 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we use the average percentage of shares owned by the 
board of directors.24 Table (2) reports the average percentage of shares owned by the 
board of directors (%Board Ownership) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
institutional ownership concentration (Ownership Concentration). The average percent of 
shares owned by the board of directors is 0.72 percent and the median is 0.2 percent, and 
is negatively related to E Index quartiles. Similarly, institutional ownership concentration 
is inversely related to the E Index, although the relationship is quite tenuous using 
median values.  
Similar to (22), we estimate the elasticity of taxable income allowing the elasticity 
of income, as well as the level of income, to depend on the Jensen-Murphy statistic, 
Equity-at-stake, %Board Ownership, and Ownership Concentration. Because the 
variables are continuous, we use both the level and quartiles of each. The generic 
specification takes the following form25 
24Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use a slightly different variable–the number of blocks of at 
least 5 percent, which is not readily available in our dataset. 
25Rather than introduce superfluous notation, we import the notation used in (22). Keep 
in mind we are abusing notation because the estimated coefficients are obviously not 
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where jQ  represents quartile dummies (e.g., I 1i t{Q Q }   if the variable for individual i
at time t  is less than the first quartile of the distribution). 
Table (4) reports the results of estimating (20). The dependent variable is taxable 
income (Income) in all specifications. Specifications (1) and (3) control for the JMS and 
EAS, respectively, using the variables as continuous indices. Recall that greater equity at 
stake is positively associated with the quality of corporate governance. Both 
specifications   indicate   that   the   executive’s   equity-at-stake is inversely related to the 
elasticity of taxable income. A one standard deviation increase in the JMS and EAS 
correspond to a decrease in the elasticity of taxable income by 0.28 and 0.34, 
respectively. Specifications (2) and (4) control for the JMS and EAS using quartile 
dummies.   Specifications   (2)   and   (4)   corroborate   that   an   executive’s   equity-at-stake is 
inversely related to the elasticity of taxable income. Executives with the least equity-at-
stake respond the most to changes in the net-of-tax rate, whereas executives with the 
most equity-at-stake respond very little, if at all. Using equity at stake is therefore 
consistent with the results in the theoretical section--the elasticity of income with respect 
to changes in marginal tax rates is inversely related to the quality of corporate 
governance.  
Similar specifications are employed for analyzing the role of the average percent 
of shares owned by the board of directors (%Board Ownership) and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of institutional ownership concentration (Ownership Concentration). 
Specification (5) indicates that the percent of shares owned by the board of directors is 
negatively associated with the elasticity of taxable income and is significant at all 
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significance levels. The elasticity of taxable income at the median percent of shares 
owned decreases by 0.7 for a one standard deviation increase in the percent of shares 
owned. Similarly, specification (7) indicates that institutional ownership concentration is 
negatively associated with the elasticity of taxable income and is significant at the 5 
percent significance level. The elasticity of taxable income at the median concentration 
index decreases by 0.19 for a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration. 
Using quartiles results in estimates similar to the baseline model.  
3.7 Robustness Checks 
Next, we demonstrate that the results are robust with respect to particular modeling 
assumptions using obvious variations to the baseline model. First we show that the results 
are not sensitive to using various quantile groups, besides the four quartiles used in the 
baseline model.26 Table (5) demonstrates that the elasticity of taxable income is 
monotonically increasing in E Indices using various quantile groups. That is, variation 
within quartiles are consistent with variation between quartiles. Specification (4) 
indicates that, using six quantiles, the income of the lowest sextile does not exhibit an 
elasticity significantly different from zero, whereas the income of the highest sextile 
exhibits a markedly elastic response.  
Second, we show that the results are consistent using the GIM index. We employ 
the GIM index using both quartiles (specification 5) and as a continuous index 
(specification 6). Similar to the baseline model, the estimates for the second and third 
26The partitions were chosen to form the most balanced blocks that are collectively exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive. 2-Groups represents the partition 0 1 2 3 4 5 6{{ } { }}      , 3-Groups 
represents 0 1 2 3 4 5 6{{ } { }}       5-Groups represents 0 1 2 3 4 5 6{{ } { }}       and 6-Groups 
represents 0 1 2 3 4 5 6{ { }}      . We do not use the 7 groups because less than one percent of the 
sample has E index equal to six. 
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quartiles are not statistically different from each other, but we can reject that the elasticity 
of the first and fourth quartiles are equal at all conventional significance levels (p-
value=0.000). Specification (6) indicates that a one point increase in the GIM Index 
corresponds to an increase in the elasticity of income by approximately 0.3 (similarly a 
one standard deviation increase in the GIM Index corresponds to an increase of in 
elasticity by approximately 0.8).  
Table (6) performs a number of further robustness checks. Specification (2) uses a 
quadratic polynomial time trend.27 Specification (2) controls for year fixed effects, which 
eliminates all variation in federal tax rates and is, therefore, typically not employed in 
related studies.28 Nevertheless, the results still show consistent variation across E Index 
quartiles. Specification (3) uses only non-imputed E Indices and specification (4) uses 
only executives with four or more years of data.29 Specification (5) uses a similar set of 
firm-controls as Goolsbee (2000), which includes return on assets and market value. 
Specification (6) uses the baseline model firm controls, the Goolsbee (2000) firm 
controls, and return on equity. We also allow for the slopes of the firm-specific control 
variables to depend on E Index quartiles by interacting all of the firm-specific controls 
with E Index quartile dummies (not reported). All of the results presented in Table (6) 
corroborate that the elasticity of taxable income is positively related to the internal 
institutions of the firm.  
3.8 Result Highlights 
27The results are robust using a cubic polynomial as well (not reported). 
28All other studies use a linear time trend and do not control for year fixed effects, except where it 
is possible to identify variation in the tax rate within years (e.g., comparing the top tax bracket 
with the second highest tax bracket). But that is not possible here because almost all of the sample 
is in top bracket. 
29Excluding executives with limited years of data possibly introduces a survivorship bias as 
opposed to an attrition bias. 
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The results indicate that the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate 
is  negatively  related  to  the  quality  of  the  firm’s  governance  regardless  of  the  indicator  of  
governance used. Thus, we reject the pure efficiency hypothesis. As indicated by 
significant variation in the elasticity of income with respect to taxes, the rent-seeking 
response appears to be large and statistically significant. Using the lower bound estimate 
derived in the conceptual model (Equation 18) and the estimated coefficients from Table 
3 specification (2), the rent-seeking response represents 54 percent of the total response 
of income with respect to taxes for the highest E Index quartile. Similarly, the lower 
bound estimates for the second and third quartiles are 26 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively. These estimates are lower bounds because we cannot disentangle the rent-
seeking response for the lowest E Index quartile. Actual rent seeking responses are 
therefore likely to be even larger than those reported above. Thus the rent-seeking 
response appears to represent a significant share of the overall response to changes in tax 
policy.  
4. Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the effort and 
rent-seeking responses to changes in marginal income tax rates. The model provides a 
framework in which variation in the elasticity of income with respect to changes in tax 
policy can be interpreted in terms of effort and rent-seeking responses. Moreover, the 
model sheds light on a lower-bound estimate of the rent-seeking response. Using a unique 
dataset of corporate executive compensation and firm corporate governance and 
empirical approach, we find that rent seeking constitutes a quantitatively and statistically 
significant response to changes in tax policy, which is consistent with Piketty, Saez, and 
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Stantcheva (2014). Moreover, we add to the literature by showing that good corporate 
governance appears to put the brake on the rent-seeking response. 
While the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
model, we are cautious to rule out all alternative interpretations. That is, it is possible that 
explanations precluding rent seeking, or at least precluding a rent-seeking response to tax 
policy, might generate similar predictions. To gain further insight, future studies should 
investigate the actual behavioral responses to changes in tax policy, not just the response 
of income, or explore further indirect testing. Another indirect test might entail 
investigating the performance of firms corresponding to changes in tax policy.  
Given the high levels of public debt in advanced nations and growing public 
support for higher taxation on the rich, or at least curtailing the rise in after-tax income 
inequality, it is likely that many countries, including the United States, will significantly 
raise top income tax rates. However, as pointed out by Hall and Liebman (2000), 
executives manage assets worth billions of dollars and the incentives that the executives 
face, which are shaped by tax policy, are of substantial importance to economic 
performance as well as government revenue. Understanding whether tax policy 
influences rent seeking is, therefore, crucial to understand the efficiency costs associated 
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This implies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (along with complementary slackness 
condition for non-negativity constraints). 
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Equations (A2) to (A4) hold with equality for interior solutions of w , q , and T  
respectively. The optimality conditions follow from inspection.  
Result 2
Using (8) and the envelope theorem implies  
(1 )(1 ) ( )














w  c  
(A5) 
Using that (1 ) ( )( )E uf V VW     and 
128
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
(1 ) 1 [ ]
E u




§ ·w   § · ¨ ¸¨ ¸w    © ¹© ¹
 (A6) 
implies the desired result after rearranging terms. 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description Source
Total Pay Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts +
Value of Options Exercised + All Other Compensation
Execucomp
Income Total taxable income: Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock
Grants + LTIP Payouts + Value of Options Exercised
Execucomp
Cash Salary + Bonus Execucomp
Options Value of options exercised Execucomp
Other Compen-
sation
Compensation not counted elsewhere and is predominately non-
taxable (Goolsbee, 2000), including severance payments, signing




Change in the value of the executive’s portfolio of stocks and
stock options from a $1000 change in firm value. The value of
the executive’s portfolio is calculated by adding the number of
shares owned and the number of (exercisable and unexercisable)
unexercised, in-the-money options, the latter multiplied by 0.7
following Baker and Hall (2004) to convert options to share-
equivalents.
Execucomp
Equity-at-stake Change in the value of the executive’s portfolio of stocks and
stock options from a 1% change in firm value (see above for
calculation of portfolio value).
Execucomp
Market Value Price-Annual Close ⇥ Outstanding Shares Compustat
Sales Sales Compustat
Leverage Total Liabilities / Assets Compustat
Market-to-Book Price-Annual Close / Book Value per share Compustat
Return on As-
sets





Average number of shares owned by board directors as a percent




Herfandal Index of institutional investor ownership concentra-
tion.
Thomas Reuters
E Index Categorical index of firm “Entrenchment”, ranging from 0 to 6,
in descending order of shareholder rights (ascending order of ex-
ecutive power). See section (3.3) for more details.
Lucian
Bebchuka
GIM Index Categorical index of firm “Governance” constructed by Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), ranging from 0-24, in descending order




Maximum tax rate (total federal and state) for an additional
$1000 of income on an initial $1,500,000 of wage income. The
taxpayer is assumed to be married and filing jointly. A mortgage
interest deduction of $150,000 and the calculated state income
tax are present as personal deductions.
TAXSIMb
aBebchuk and Ferrell (2008). Data hosted at www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
bFeenberg, Daniel Richard, and Elizabeth Coutts, 1993 See www.nber.org/⇠taxsim/state-rates for a
description of the simulation used.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by E Index Quartiles (1992-2005): mean (top row) and
median (bottom row) values
E Index Quartile All 1 2 3 4
# Observations 31,297 7,712 7,238 8,957 7,390
Executive Compensation
Total Pay (x1000) 2,938 3,984 2,973 2,411 2,453
1,217 1,428 1,238 1,129 1,153
Income (x1000) 2,442 3,342 2,456 1,991 2,034
989 1,151 1,015 903 950
Cash (x1000) 1,050 1,278 1,051 929 957
722 829 735 673 693
Options Exercised (x1000) 1,365 2,054 1,394 1,026 1,027
96 111 102 90 88
Other Compensation (x1000) 169 208 165 145 160
32 32 30 32 35
Executive Wealth Sensitivity
Jensen-Murphy Statistic 9.58 12.17 9.78 7.80 8.90
2.35 2.13 2.43 2.30 2.48
Equity-at-stake 0.203 0.257 0.207 0.165 0.188
0.051 0.047 0.053 0.051 0.054
Firm Financials
Market value (x1mil) 13,823 28,721 12,694 8,145 6,269
3,750 5,626 3,710 3,619 2,966
Market-to-Book 3.17 3.65 3.39 2.87 2.80
2.40 2.55 2.57 2.38 2.22
Leverage 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.66
0.63 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.66
Return on Assets 4.35 3.87 4.27 4.84 4.35
4.10 3.66 4.51 4.26 3.89
Firm Governance
%Board Ownership 0.72 1.06 0.81 0.51 0.57
0.20 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17
Ownership Concentration 0.057 0.071 0.055 0.052 0.049
0.044 0.046 0.042 0.044 0.043
Governance (GIM index) 9.57 6.88 8.78 10.55 11.96
Note: See Table 1 for a description of variables. Sample includes
executives with permanent income greater than $400,000 in 2006 US$
and at firms with fiscal years ending in December. All prices deflated
by the Consumer Price Index in 2006$.
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Table 3: Elasticity of various forms of compensation with respect to the net-of-tax
rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E1} 1.525*** 1.724*** 0.195 3.954*** 2.904*** 2.815***
(0.407) (0.371) (0.268) (1.022) (0.495) (0.493)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E2} 2.373*** 2.547*** 0.775*** 6.428*** 3.212*** 3.095
(0.381) (0.348) (0.251) (0.957) (0.463) (0.468)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E3} 2.514*** 2.849*** 0.950*** 7.993*** 3.325*** 3.624***
(0.351) (0.320) (0.231) (0.875) (0.430) (0.424)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E4} 3.316*** 3.614*** 1.363*** 7.169*** 3.661*** 4.003***
(0.376) (0.343) (0.248) (0.940) (0.457) (0.444)
(1-⌧t+1)⇥I{E 2 E1} -2.865*** -3.082***
(0.347) (0.315)
(1-⌧t+1)⇥I{E 2 E2} -2.854*** -3.076***
(0.347) (0.315)
(1-⌧t+1)⇥I{E 2 E3} -2.861*** -3.076***
(0.348) (0.315)




} -3.378* -3.268** -2.295** -9.909** -1.209 -1.104
(1.760) (1.607) (1.160) (4.423) (2.071) (2.414)
I{E 2 E
3
} -3.897** -4.426*** -3.007** -16.05*** -1.593 -3.177
(1.822) (1.663) (1.201) (4.563) (2.149) (2.307)
I{E 2 E
4
} -7.073*** -7.470*** -4.692*** -12.59*** -2.875 -4.672*
(1.947) (1.776) (1.284) (4.878) (2.289) (2.381)
Market Value 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.329*** 0.0737*** 0.751*** 0.343*** 0.355*** 0.343***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.035) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
+Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Federal Tax Rates No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 26,727 26,727 26,736 26,713 25,999 20,896 20,559 26,044
# of Executives 6,063 6,063 6,063 6,063 5,993 5,365 5,302 7,004
R-squared 0.208 0.209 0.251 0.131 0.149 0.195 0.197 0.120
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1992-2005, prices in 2006 constant dollars. All estimations
control for executive-firm fixed effects and a linear time trend. Income represents total taxable income and
includes: Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + Value of Options Exercised. Total pay
includes Income + Other compensation (non-taxable). Cash represents Salary + Bonus. Options refers to the
value of options exercised. All specifications control for the combined federal and state net-of-tax rate, except
specification (8) uses only federal rates. I{E2Ej} is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive-firm’s E
index belongs to the j quartile and 0 if otherwise. +Firm Controls includes: Sales, Market-to-Book value, and
Leverage in the previous year. All non-ratio-scale variables, including all forms of compensation, the net-of-tax
rate, Market Value, and Sales, are in log form. Sample includes executives with permanent income greater than
$400,000 in 2006 US$. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 4: Elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate (dep var:
Income).
Jensen-Murphy Equity-at-stake %Board Ownership Ownership Concentration
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Index Quartiles Index Quartiles Index Quartiles Index Quartiles
(1-⌧t) 1.593*** 1.626*** 2.364*** 1.935***
(0.004) (0.237) (0.361) (0.249)
Index ⇥(1-⌧t) -0.009*** -0.531*** -0.370*** -3.206**
(3.439) (0.171) (0.085) (1.527)
Index 0.0382*** 2.195*** 1.496*** 12.56**
(0.014) (0.691) (0.344) (6.167)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{Q 2 Q1} 2.603*** 2.703*** 3.592*** 2.070***
(0.355) (0.357) (0.428) (0.285)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{Q 2 Q2} 1.950*** 2.041*** 2.035*** 1.434**
(0.310) (0.311) (0.427) (0.274)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{Q 2 Q3} 1.415*** 1.440*** 0.997** 0.734**
(0.301) (0.300) (0.440) (0.304)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{Q 2 Q4} 0.134 0.216 1.013 1.572***
(0.323) (0.320) (0.494) (0.368)
I{Q 2 Q
2
} 2.650* 2.701* 6.327*** 2.458**
(1.388) (1.395) (1.574) (1.093)
I{Q 2 Q
3
} 4.764*** 5.085*** 10.42*** 5.193***
(1.518) (1.519) (1.747) (1.240)
I{Q 2 Q
4
} 9.925*** 10.04*** 10.25*** 1.782
(1.618) (1.618) (1.995) (1.494)
+Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,876 34,876 34,876 34,875 20,893 20,893 33,982 33,982
# of Executives 8,195 8,195 8,195 8,195 8,451 8,451 7,358 7,358
R-squared 0.183 0.182 0.183 0.185 0.148 0.148 0.205 0.199
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1992-2005, prices in 2006 constant dollars. All estimations control
for executive-firm fixed effects and a linear time trend. The dependent variable is total taxable income, which
includes: Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + Value of Options Exercised. The variable
Index indicates that the independent variables are considered continuous and I{Q 2 Qj} is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the index is in the j quartile of the distribution and 0 otherwise. The Jensen-Murphy Index is the
change in executive wealth from all stocks and unexercised stock options held from a $1000 change in firm value.
The Equity-at-stake Index is the change in executive wealth from a change of 1% change in firm value. %Board
Ownership is the average percent of shares owned by the board of directors. Ownership concentration refers to
the Herfandal Index of institutional investor ownership concentration. +Firm Controls includes: Market Value,
Sales, Market-to-Book value, and Leverage. All non-ratio-scale variables, including all forms of compensation, the
net-of-tax rate (1 ⌧), Market Value, and Sales, are in log form. Sample includes executives with permanent income
greater than $400,000 in 2006 US$. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 5: Elasticity of Taxable Income with respect to the net-of-tax rate using various
E Index quantiles and the GIM Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 2-Groups 3-Groups 5-Groups 6-Groups G Index G quantiles
(1-⌧t)⇥ I{E 2 E1} 2.070*** 2.052*** 1.528*** 0.543
(0.326) (0.326) (0.407) (0.583)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E2} 2.877*** 2.496*** 2.367*** 1.854***
(0.295) (0.350) (0.381) (0.450)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E3} 3.298*** 2.469*** 2.421***
(0.376) (0.350) (0.381)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E4} 2.573*** 2.506***
(0.404) (0.351)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E5} 6.552*** 2.610***
(0.720) (0.405)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E 2 E6} 6.582***
(0.720)
(1-⌧t)⇥ I{ G 2 G1} 1.547***
(0.377)
(1-⌧t)⇥ I{G 2 G2} 2.405***
(0.340)
(1-⌧t)⇥ I{G 2 G3} 2.049***
(0.344)








+Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,727 26,727 26,727 26,727 29,167 29,167
# of Executives 6,063 6,063 6,063 6,063 6,560 6,560
R-squared 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.210 0.200 0.200
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1992-2005, prices in 2006 constant dol-
lars. All estimations control for executive-firm fixed effects and a linear time trend. The
dependent variable is taxable income, which includes: Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock
Grants + LTIP Payouts + Value of Options Exercised. I{E2Ej} is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the executive-firm’s E index belongs to j quantile and 0 if otherwise. 2-Groups
represents E index medians, 3-Groups represents E index terciles, and so forth. Similarly,
I{G2Gj} is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive-firm’s GIM index belongs to
the j quartile. GIM Index uses the index as a continuous-type variable. +Firm Controls
includes: market value, sales, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. All non-ratio-scale vari-
ables, including all forms of compensation, the net-of-tax rate, market value, and sales, are
in log form. Sample includes executives with permanent income greater than $400,000 in
2006 US$. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 6: Elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate robustness
checks (dep var: Income).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Restricted Restricted Goolsbee All Firm
+Trend2 Dummies Samplea Sampleb Controlsc Controls
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E=0-1} 0.946** 1.835 1.153 1.470*** 1.695*** 1.853***
(0.468) (1.579) (0.710) (0.411) (0.406) (0.397)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E=2} 1.787*** 2.617* 2.973*** 2.350*** 2.555*** 2.828***
(0.447) (1.578) (0.656) (0.385) (0.381) (0.373)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E=3} 1.919*** 2.802* 3.101*** 2.462*** 2.650*** 2.870***
(0.423) (1.564) (0.603) (0.354) (0.350) (0.342)
(1-⌧t)⇥I{E=4-6} 2.720*** 3.584** 4.465*** 3.353*** 3.561*** 3.393***
(0.445) (1.570) (0.647) (0.380) (0.391) (0.368)
Market Value 0.397*** 0.382*** 0.471*** 0.405*** 0.300*** 0.397***
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0256) (0.0140) (0.0118) (0.0149)
Return on Assets 0.00280*** 0.0035***
(0.0006) (0.0009)
Return on Equity -2.35e-05
(0.0002)
Linear Trend Yes n.a. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Trend Yes n.a. No No No No
Year Dummies No Yes No No No No
+Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 26,727 26,727 11,904 24,935 26,810 26,276
# of Executives 6,063 5,063 5486 5,834 6,066 5,992
R-squared 0.209 0.219 0.226 0.206 0.203 0.216
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1992-2005, prices in 2006 constant dollars.
All estimations control for executive-firm fixed effects and a linear time trend. The depen-
dent variable is total taxable income, which includes: Salary + Bonus + Restricted Stock
Grants + LTIP Payouts + Value of Options Exercised. aSpecification 3 employs only the
actual (non-imputed) E Index data. bSpecification 4 restricts the sample to executives with
at least 4 observation years. cGoolsbee Controls refers to identical firm controls employed
in Goolsbee (2000), which includes return on assets and market value. Specification (6)
controls for the baseline firm controls, the Goolsbee controls, and return on equity. +Firm
Controls includes: market value, sales, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. All non-ratio-
scale variables, including all forms of compensation, the net-of-tax rate, market value, and
sales, are in log form. Sample includes executives with permanent income greater than
$400,000 in 2006 US$ and at firms with fiscal years ending in December. Standard errors
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